Breaching the social contract: crises of democratic representation and patterns of extreme right party support

Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to fascism experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-WWII Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by (a) carrying out a controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain and (b) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis, i.e. economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse.

Analysing institutional partnerships in development: a contract between equals or a loaded process?

Partnerships are complex, diverse and subtle relationships, the nature of which changes with time, but they are vital for the functioning of the development chain. This paper reviews the meaning of partnership between development institutions as well as some of the main approaches taken to analyse the relationships. The latter typically revolve around analyses based on power, discourse, interdependence and functionality. The paper makes the case for taking a multianalytical approach to understanding partnership but points out three problem areas: identifying acceptable/unacceptable trade-offs between characteristics of partnership, the analysis of multicomponent partnerships (where one partner has a number of other partners) and the analysis of long-term partnership. The latter is especially problematic for long-term partnerships between donors and field agencies that share an underlying commitment based on religious beliefs. These problems with current methods of analysing partnership are highlighted by focusing upon the Catholic Church-based development chain, linking donors in the North (Europe) and their field partners in the South (Abuja Ecclesiastical Province, Nigeria). It explores a narrated history of a relationship with a single donor spanning 35 years from the perspective of one partner (the field agency).

The impact of contract duration on the cost of cash retention

Cash retention is a common means of protecting an employer from a contractor's insolvency as well as ensuring that contractors finish the work that they start. Similarly, contractors withhold part of payments due to their sub-contractors. Larger contracts tend to be subjected to smaller rates of retention. By calculating the cost of retention as an amount per year of a contract, it is shown that retention is far more expensive for firms whose work consists of short contracts. The extra cost is multiplied when the final payment is delayed, as it often is for those whose work takes place at the beginning of a project. This may explain why it is that main contractors are a lot less interested than sub-contractors in alternatives to cash retention, such as retention bonds

Construction contract policy: do we mean what we say?

Recent developments in contracting practice in the UK have built upon recommendations contained in highprofile reports, such as those by Latham and Egan. However, the New Engineering Contract (NEC), endorsed by Latham, is based upon principles of contract drafting that seem open to question. Any contract operates in the context of its legislative environment and current working practices. This report identifies eight contentious hypotheses in the literature on construction contracts and tests their validity in a sample survey that attracted 190 responses. The survey shows, among other things, that while partnership is a positive and useful idea, authoritative contract management is considered more effective and that “win-win” contracts, while desirable, are basically impractical. Further, precision and fairness in contracts are not easy to achieve simultaneously. While participants should know what is in their contracts, they should not routinely resort to legal action; and standard-form contracts should not seek to be universally applicable. Fundamental changes to drafting policy should be undertaken within the context of current legal contract doctrine and with a sensitivity to the way that contracts are used in contemporary practice. Attitudes to construction contracting may seem to be changing on the surface, but detailed analysis of what lies behind apparent agreement on new ways of working reveals that attitudes are changing much more slowly than they appear to be.

Plagiarism, contract cheating and final year projects

Presentation on pre-emption, detection and redirection in the context of the contract cheating form of plagiarism.

Field evaluation of systemic inducing resistance chemicals at different growth stages for the control of apple (Venturia inaequalis) and pear (Venturia pirina) scab

Two field trials were conducted using established apple (Malus cv. Golden Delicious) and pear (Pyrus communis 'Williams' Bon Chretien') to assess the efficacy of three commercially available systemic inducing resistance (SIR) products, Messenger (a.i. Harpin protein), Phoenix (a.i. Potassium phosphite) and Rigel (a.i. Salicylic acid derivative) applied at four different growth stages of tree development (bud break, green cluster, 90% petal fall, early fruitlet) against the foliar pathogens Venturia inaequalis and Venturia pirina which cause apple and pear scab respectively. A conventional synthetic fungicide (penconazole) used within the UK for apple and pear scab control was included for comparison. Little efficacy as scab protectants was demonstrated when each SIR product and penconazole was applied at only two growth stages (bud break, green cluster). However when the above compounds were applied at three or more growth stages efficacy as scab protectants was confirmed. The synthetic fungicide penconazole provided greatest protection against apple and pear scab in both the 2006 and 2007 field trials. There was little difference in the magnitude of scab protection conferred by each SIR agent. Results suggest application of at least three sprays during bud break to early fruitlet formation with an appropriate SIR agent may provide a useful addition to existing methods of apple and pear scab management under field conditions. (C) 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

The engineer under FDIC's conditions of contract for construction

FIDIC has over the years produced standard forms of contracts for the international procurement of projects. A source of continuing criticism of its Red Book concerns the duality in the traditional role of the engineer as the employer's agent and as an independent third party holding the balance fairly between the employer and the contractor. In response to this and other criticisms FIDIC produced a replacement for it in 1999. The role of the engineer under the new Red Book is critically examined in the light of relevant case law, expert commentaries and feedback from two multidisciplinary workshops with international participation. The examination identified three major changes: (1) a duty to act impartially has been replaced by a duty to make fair determination of certain matters; (2) it is open to parties to allow greater control of the engineer by the employer by stating in the appropriate part of the contract powers the engineer must not exercise without the employer's approval; (3) there is provision for a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) to which disputes may be referred. Although the duality has not been eliminated completely, the contract is structured flexibly enough to support those who wish to contract on the basis of the engineer acting solely as the agent of the employer.

Responsiveness to change by standard-form contract drafters: A case study of the FIDIC White Book

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on the Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC) White Book standard form of building contract. It tracks the changes to this contract over its four editions, and seeks to identify their underlying causes. Design/methodology/approach – The changes made to the White Book are quantified using a specific type of quantitative content analysis. The amended clauses are then examined to understand the nature of the changes made. Findings – The length of the contract increased by 34 per cent between 1990 and 2006. A large proportion of the overall increase can be attributed to the clauses dealing with “conflict of interest/corruption” and “dispute resolution”. In both instances, the FIDIC drafting committees have responded to international developments to discourage corruption, and to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution. Between 1998 and 2006, the average length of the sentences increased slightly, raising the question of whether long sentences are easily understood by users of contracts. Research limitations/implications – Quantification of text appears to be particularly useful for the analysis of documents which are regularly updated because changes can be clearly identified and the length of sentences can be determined, leading to conclusions about the readability of the text. However, caution is needed because changes of great relevance can be made to contract clauses without actually affecting their length. Practical implications – The paper will be instructive for contract drafters and informative for users of FIDIC's White Book. Originality/value – Quantifying text has been rarely used regarding standard-form contracts in the field of construction.

Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract

This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.