Right ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices mediate adaptive decisions under ambiguity by integrating choice utility and outcome evaluation.

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is one of the most influential behavioral paradigms in reward-related decision making and has been, most notably, associated with ventromedial prefrontal cortex function. However, performance in the IGT relies on a complex set of cognitive subprocesses, in particular integrating information about the outcome of choices into a continuously updated decision strategy under ambiguous conditions. The complexity of the task has made it difficult for neuroimaging studies to disentangle the underlying neurocognitive processes. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging in combination with a novel adaptation of the task, which allowed us to examine separately activation associated with the moment of decision or the evaluation of decision outcomes. Importantly, using whole-brain regression analyses with individual performance, in combination with the choice/outcome history of individual subjects, we aimed to identify the neural overlap between areas that are involved in the evaluation of outcomes and in the progressive discrimination of the relative value of available choice options, thus mapping the two fundamental cognitive processes that lead to adaptive decision making. We show that activation in right ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was predictive of adaptive performance, in both discriminating disadvantageous from advantageous decisions and confirming negative decision outcomes. We propose that these two prefrontal areas mediate shifting away from disadvantageous choices through their sensitivity to accumulating negative outcomes. These findings provide functional evidence of the underlying processes by which these prefrontal subregions drive adaptive choice in the task, namely through contingency-sensitive outcome evaluation.

On the utility of input selection and pruning for financial distress prediction models

Analyzes the use of linear and neural network models for financial distress classification, with emphasis on the issues of input variable selection and model pruning. A data-driven method for selecting input variables (financial ratios, in this case) is proposed. A case study involving 60 British firms in the period 1997-2000 is used for illustration. It is shown that the use of the Optimal Brain Damage pruning technique can considerably improve the generalization ability of a neural model. Moreover, the set of financial ratios obtained with the proposed selection procedure is shown to be an appropriate alternative to the ratios usually employed by practitioners.

A theory of rational spatial agglomerations

We model the behavior of rational forward-looking agents in a spatial economy. The economic geography structure is built on Fujita et al. (1999)'s racetrack economy. Workers choose optimally what to consume at each period, as well as which spatial itinerary to follow in the geographical space. The spatial extent of the resulting agglomerations increases with the taste for variety and the expenditure share on manufactured goods, and decreases with transport costs. Because forward-looking agents anticipate the future formation of agglomerations, they are more responsive to spatial utility differentials than myopic agents. As a consequence, the emerging agglomerations are larger under perfect foresight spatial adjustments than under myopic ones.

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.