The initial return performance of UK property company IPOs

This paper presents empirical evidence for a sample of 48 UK property company initial public offerings over the period 1986 to 1995. From which a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, property companies in general show positive average first day returns. Second, the average first day return by property trading companies is significantly higher than that for property investment companies

The long-run performance of IPOs: the case of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius

This study examines the long-run performance of initial public offerings on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM). The results show that the 3-year equally weighted cumulative adjusted returns average −16.5%. The magnitude of this underperformance is consistent with most reported studies in different developed and emerging markets. Based on multivariate regression models, firms with small issues and higher ex ante financial strength seem on average to experience greater long-run underperformance, supporting the divergence of opinion and overreaction hypotheses. On the other hand, Mauritian firms do not on average time their offerings to lower cost of capital and as such, there seems to be limited support for the windows of opportunity hypothesis.

Urban economic openness and IPO underpricing

We examine the empirical impact of trade openness on the short-run underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) using city-level real estate data. This paper represents a first attempt to employ a macroeconomic approach to explain IPO performance. We investigate an openness effect in which urban economic openness (UEO) has a significant impact on the productivity and on the prices of both direct and indirect real estate due to productivity gains of companies in more open areas. This in turn positively affects the firm’s profitability, enhancing the confidence in the local real estate market and the future company performance and decreasing the uncertainty of the IPO valuation. And as a result, we find that issuers have less incentive to underprice the IPO shares. China provides a suitable experimental ground to study the immense underpricing in developing markets, which cannot solely be accounted for by firm specific effects. First, Chinese real estate companies show strong geographic patterns focusing their businesses locally – usually at a city level. Second, we observe a degree of openness which is significantly heterogeneous across Chinese cities. Controlling for company-specific variables, location and state ownership, we find the evidence that companies whose businesses are in economically more open areas experience less IPO underpricing. Our results show high explanatory power and are robust to diverse specifications.

Exposing the myth of the 1:5:200 ratio relating initial cost, maintenance and staffing costs of office buildings

In an attempt to focus clients' minds on the importance of considering the construction and maintenance costs of a commercial office building (both as a factor in staff productivity and as a fraction of lifetime staff costs) there is an often-quoted ratio of costs of 1:5:200, where for every one pound spent on construction cost, five are spent on maintenance and building operating costs and 200 on staffing and business operating costs. This seems to stem from a paper published by the Royal Academy of Engineering, in which no data is given and no derivation or defence of the ratio appears. The accompanying belief that higher quality design and construction increases staff productivity, and simultaneously reduces maintenance costs, how ever laudable, appears unsupported by research, and carries all the hallmarks of an "urban myth". In tracking down data about real buildings, a more realistic ratio appears to depend on a huge variety of variables, as well as the definition of the number of "lifetime" years. The ill-defined origins of the original ratio (1:5:200) describing these variables have made replication impossible. However, by using published sources of data, we have found that for three office buildings, a more realistic ratio is 1:0.4:12. As there is nothing in the public domain about what comprised the original research that gave rise to 1:5:200, it is not possible to make a true comparison between these new calculations and the originals. Clients and construction professionals stand to be misled because the popularity and widespread use of the wrong ratio appears to be mis-informing important investment and policy decisions.