Exploiting a hybrid environmental design strategy in the continental climate of Beijing

The built environment in China is required to achieve a 50% reduction in carbon emissions by 2020 against the 1980 design standard. A particular challenge is how to maintain acceptable comfort conditions through the hot humid summers and cold desiccating winters of its continental climate regions. Fully air-conditioned sealed envelopes, often fully glazed, are becoming increasingly common in these regions. Remedial strategies involve technical refinements to the air-handling equipment and a contribution from renewable energy sources in an attempt to achieve the prescribed net reduction in energy use. However an alternative hybrid environmental design strategy is developed in this research project. It exploits observed temperate periods of weeks, days, even hours in duration to free-run an office and exhibition building configured to promote natural stack ventilation when ambient conditions permit and mechanical ventilation when conditions require it, the two modes delivered through the same physical infrastructure. The proposal is modelled in proprietary software and the methodology adopted is described. The challenge is compounded by its first practical application to an existing reinforced concrete frame originally designed to receive a highly glazed envelope. This original scheme is reviewed in comparison. Furthermore the practical delivery of the proposal value engineered out a proportion of the ventilation stacks. The likely consequence of this for the environmental performance of the building is investigated through a sensitivity study.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.