Experimental philosophy of language

Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed.

The philosophy of W. Ross Ashby and its relationship to 'The Matrix'

Ashby was a keen observer of the world around him, as per his technological and psychiatrical developments. Over the years, he drew numerous philosophical conclusions on the nature of human intelligence and the operation of the brain, on artificial intelligence and the thinking ability of computers and even on science in general. In this paper, the quite profound philosophy espoused by Ashby is considered as a whole, in particular in terms of its relationship with the world as it stands now and even in terms of scientific predictions of where things might lead. A meaningful comparison is made between Ashby's comments and the science fiction concept of 'The Matrix' and serious consideration is given as to how much Ashby's ideas lay open the possibility of the matrix becoming a real world eventuality.

Conjecture, proof, and sense in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics

One of the key tenets in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is that a mathematical proposition gets its meaning from its proof. This seems to have the paradoxical consequence that a mathematical conjecture has no meaning, or at least not the same meaning that it will have once a proof has been found. Hence, it would appear that a conjecture can never be proven true: for what is proven true must ipso facto be a different proposition from what was only conjectured. Moreover, it would appear impossible that the same mathematical proposition be proven in different ways. — I will consider some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on these issues, and attempt to reconstruct his position in a way that makes it appear less paradoxical.

Linguistic experiments and ordinary language philosophy

J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his `donkey stories', that `mistake' and `accident' apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as `intentionally' and `deliberately'). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.

Evaluation of reach and grasp robot-assisted therapy suggests similar functional recovery patterns on proximal and distal arm segments in sub-acute hemiplegia

This paper provides some additional evidence in support of the hypothesis that robot therapies are clinically beneficial in neurorehabilitation. Although only 4 subjects were included in the study, the design of the intervention and the measures were done so as to minimise bias. The results are presented as single case studies, and can only be interpreted as such due to the study size. The intensity of intervention was 16 hours and the therapy philosophy (based on Carr and Shepherd) was that coordinated movements are preferable to joint based therapies, and that coordinating distal movements (in this case grasps) helps not only to recover function in these areas, but has greater value since the results are immediately transferable to daily skills such as reach and grasp movements.