The trilogy of John of God

Monteiro’s assertion of the almighty auteur, after the post-structuralist and post-modern experiences, which had shattered the author and his work in theory and practice, reinstates an authority aimed at organising the chaos caused by the lack of narrative. In a way, therefore, Monteiro’s output is conservative, displaying a peculiar atemporal style, which seems entirely immune to fashion. On the other hand, however, few contemporary films could be more radical than his. Authorship, in his case, means the absence of limits and total freedom of expressing his obsessive world.

'Nature concocts & expels': the agents and processes of recovery from disease in Early Modern England

The ‘golden saying’ in early modern medicine was ‘Nature is the healer of disease’. This article uncovers the meaning and significance of this forgotten axiom by investigating perceptions of the agents and physiological processes of recovery from illness in England, c.1580-1720. Drawing on sources such as medical texts and diaries, it shows that doctors and laypeople attributed recovery to three agents – God, Nature, and the practitioner. While scholars are familiar with the roles of providence and medicine, the vital agency of Nature has been overlooked. In theory, the agents operated in a hierarchy: Nature was ‘God’s instrument’, and the physician, ‘Nature’s servant’; but in practice the power balance was more ambivalent. Nature was depicted both as a housewife who cooked and cleaned the humours, and as a warrior, who defeated the disease. Through exploring these complex dynamics, the article sheds fresh light on concepts of gender, disease, and bodies.

Divine premotion

According to divine premotionism, God does not merely create and sustain the universe. He also moves all secondary causes to action as instruments without undermining their intrinsic causal efficacy. I explain and uphold the premotionist theory, which is the theory of St Thomas Aquinas and his most prominent exponents. I defend the premotionist interpretation of Aquinas in some textual detail, with particular reference to Suarez and to a recent paper by Louis Mancha. Critics, including Molinists and Suarezians, raise various objections to the view that premotion is compatible with genuine secondary causation. I rebut a number of these objections, in the course of which I respond to the central challenge that premotionism destroys free will. I also offer a number of positive reasons for embracing the premotionist theory.