Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract

This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.

“Financial alchemy” or a zero sum game? Real estate finance, securitisation and the UK property market

Following the US model, the UK has seen considerable innovation in the funding, finance and procurement of real estate in the last decade. In the growing CMBS market asset backed securitisations have included $2.25billion secured on the Broadgate office development and issues secured on Canary Wharf and the Trafford Centre regional mall. Major occupiers (retailer Sainsbury’s, retail bank Abbey National) have engaged in innovative sale & leaseback and outsourcing schemes. Strong claims are made concerning the benefits of such schemes – e.g. British Land were reported to have reduced their weighted cost of debt by 150bp as a result of the Broadgate issue. The paper reports preliminary findings from a project funded by the Corporation of London and the RICS Research Foundation examining a number of innovative schemes to identify, within a formal finance framework, sources of added value and hidden costs. The analysis indicates that many of the gains claimed conceal costs – in terms of market value of debt or flexibility of management – while others result from unusual firm or market conditions (for example utilising the UK long lease and the unusual shape of the yield curve). Nonetheless, there are real gains resulting from the innovations, reflecting arbitrage and institutional constraints in the direct (private) real estate market

Formal theory building for the avalanche game: explaining counter-intuitive behaviour of a complex system using geometrical and human behavioural/physiological effects

In 'Avalanche', an object is lowered, players staying in contact throughout. Normally the task is easily accomplished. However, with larger groups counter-intuitive behaviours appear. The paper proposes a formal theory for the underlying causal mechanisms. The aim is to not only provide an explicit, testable hypothesis for the source of the observed modes of behaviour-but also to exemplify the contribution that formal theory building can make to understanding complex social phenomena. Mapping reveals the importance of geometry to the Avalanche game; each player has a pair of balancing loops, one involved in lowering the object, the other ensuring contact. For more players, sets of balancing loops interact and these can allow dominance by reinforcing loops, causing the system to chase upwards towards an ever-increasing goal. However, a series of other effects concerning human physiology and behaviour (HPB) is posited as playing a role. The hypothesis is therefore rigorously tested using simulation. For simplicity a 'One Degree of Freedom' case is examined, allowing all of the effects to be included whilst rendering the analysis more transparent. Formulation and experimentation with the model gives insight into the behaviours. Multi-dimensional rate/level analysis indicates that there is only a narrow region in which the system is able to move downwards. Model runs reproduce the single 'desired' mode of behaviour and all three of the observed 'problematic' ones. Sensitivity analysis gives further insight into the system's modes and their causes. Behaviour is seen to arise only when the geometric effects apply (number of players greater than degrees of freedom of object) in combination with a range of HPB effects. An analogy exists between the co-operative behaviour required here and various examples: conflicting strategic objectives in organizations; Prisoners' Dilemma and integrated bargaining situations. Additionally, the game may be relatable in more direct algebraic terms to situations involving companies in which the resulting behaviours are mediated by market regulations. Finally, comment is offered on the inadequacy of some forms of theory building and the case is made for formal theory building involving the use of models, analysis and plausible explanations to create deep understanding of social phenomena.

Dynamic game soundtrack generation in response to a continously varying emotional trajectory

Dynamic soundtracking presents various practical and aesthetic challenges to composers working with games. This paper presents an implementation of a system addressing some of these challenges with an affectively-driven music generation algorithm based on a second order Markov-model. The system can respond in real-time to emotional trajectories derived from 2-dimensions of affect on the circumplex model (arousal and valence), which are mapped to five musical parameters. A transition matrix is employed to vary the generated output in continuous response to the affective state intended by the gameplay.

Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.