Does anticipation training affect drivers' risk taking?

Skill and risk taking are argued to be independent and to require different remedial programs. However, it is possible to contend that skill-based training could be associated with an increase, a decrease, or no change in risk taking behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors examined the influence of a skill-based training program (hazard perception) on the risk taking behavior of car drivers (using video-based driving simulations). Experiment 1 demonstrated a decrease in risk taking for novice drivers. In Experiment 2, the authors examined the possibilities that the skills training might operate through either a nonspecific reduction in risk taking or a specific improvement in hazard perception. Evidence supported the latter. These findings were replicated in a more ecological context in Experiment 3, which compared advanced and nonadvanced police drivers.

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.

A behavioral comparison between motorcyclists and a matched group of non-motorcycling car drivers: factors influencing accident risk

Motorcyclists and a matched group of non-motorcycling car drivers were assessed on behavioral measures known to relate to accident involvement. Using a range of laboratory measures, we found that motorcyclists chose faster speeds than the car drivers, overtook more, and pulled into smaller gaps in traffic, though they did not travel any closer to the vehicle in front. The speed and following distance findings were replicated by two further studies involving unobtrusive roadside observation. We suggest that the increased risk-taking behavior of motorcyclists was only likely to account for a small proportion of the difference in accident risk between motorcyclists and car drivers. A second group of motorcyclists was asked to complete the simulator tests as if driving a car. They did not differ from the non-motorcycling car drivers on the risk-taking measures but were better at hazard perception. There were also no differences for sensation seeking, mild social deviance, and attitudes to riding/driving, indicating that the risk-taking tendencies of motorcyclists did not transfer beyond motorcycling, while their hazard perception skill did. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Responsibility effects in decision making under risk

We systematically explore decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsibility for somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own in situations of payoff equality. In the gain domain we confirm the intuition that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. This is however not attributable to a 'cautious shift' as often thought. Indeed, looking at risk attitudes in the loss domain, we find an increase in risk seeking under responsibility. This raises issues about the nature of various decision biases under risk, and to what extent changed behavior under responsibility may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility versus naive corrections from perceived biases. To further explore this issue, we designed a second experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small or very large probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we find increased risk aversion, thus confirming our earlier finding. For small probabilities however, we find an increase of risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. The latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule dictating caution under responsibility, and can be explained through flexible self-correction models predicting an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory. An additional accountability mechanism does not change risk behavior, except for mixed prospects, in which it reduces loss aversion. This indicates that loss aversion is of a fundamentally different nature than probability weighting or utility curvature. Implications for debiasing are discussed.

The risk-taking and self-harm inventory for adolescents: Development and psychometric evaluation

In this study, we report on the development and psychometric evaluation of the Risk-Taking (RT) and Self-Harm (SH) Inventory for Adolescents (RTSHIA), a self-report measure designed to assess adolescent RT and SH in community and clinical settings. 651 young people from secondary schools in England ranging in age from 11.6 years to 18.7 years and 71 young people referred to mental health services for SH behavior in London between the ages of 11.9 years and 17.5 years completed the RTSHIA along with standardized measures of adolescent psychopathology. Two factors emerged from the principal axis factoring, and RT and SH were further validated by a confirmatory factor analysis as related, but different, constructs, rather than elements of a single continuum. Inter-item and test–retest reliabilities were high for both components (Cronbach's α = .85, rtt = .90; Cronbach's α .93, rtt = .87), and considerable evidence emerged in support of the measure's convergent, concurrent, and divergent validity. The findings are discussed with regard to potential usefulness of the RTSHIA for research and clinical purposes with adolescents.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.