Predicting microbial pollution concentrations in UK rivers in response to land use change

The Water Framework Directive has caused a paradigm shift towards the integrated management of recreational water quality through the development of drainage basin-wide programmes of measures. This has increased the need for a cost-effective diagnostic tool capable of accurately predicting riverine faecal indicator organism (FIO) concentrations. This paper outlines the application of models developed to fulfil this need, which represent the first transferrable generic FIO models to be developed for the UK to incorporate direct measures of key FIO sources (namely human and livestock population data) as predictor variables. We apply a recently developed transfer methodology, which enables the quantification of geometric mean presumptive faecal coliforms and presumptive intestinal enterococci concentrations for base- and high-flow during the summer bathing season in unmonitored UK watercourses, to predict FIO concentrations in the Humber river basin district. Because the FIO models incorporate explanatory variables which allow the effects of policy measures which influence livestock stocking rates to be assessed, we carry out empirical analysis of the differential effects of seven land use management and policy instruments (fiscal constraint, production constraint, cost intervention, area intervention, demand-side constraint, input constraint, and micro-level land use management) all of which can be used to reduce riverine FIO concentrations. This research provides insights into FIO source apportionment, explores a selection of pollution remediation strategies and the spatial differentiation of land use policies which could be implemented to deliver river quality improvements. All of the policy tools we model reduce FIO concentrations in rivers but our research suggests that the installation of streamside fencing in intensive milk producing areas may be the single most effective land management strategy to reduce riverine microbial pollution.

Evaluation of field wetlands for mitigation of diffuse pollution from agriculture: sediment retention, cost and effectiveness

Diffuse pollution, and the contribution from agriculture in particular, has become increasingly important as pollution from point sources has been addressed by wastewater treatment. Land management approaches, such as construction of field wetlands, provide one group of mitigation options available to farmers. Although field wetlands are widely used for diffuse pollution control in temperate environments worldwide, there is a shortage of evidence for the effectiveness and viability of these mitigation options in the UK. The Mitigation Options for Phosphorus and Sediment Project aims to make recommendations regarding the design and effectiveness of field wetlands for diffuse pollution control in UK landscapes. Ten wetlands have been built on four farms in Cumbria and Leicestershire. This paper focuses on sediment retention within the wetlands, estimated from annual sediment surveys in the first two years, and discusses establishment costs. It is clear that the wetlands are effective in trapping a substantial amount of sediment. Estimates of annual sediment retention suggest higher trapping rates at sandy sites (0.5–6 t ha�1 yr�1), compared to silty sites (0.02–0.4 t ha�1 yr�1) and clay sites (0.01–0.07 t ha�1 yr�1). Establishment costs for the wetlands ranged from £280 to £3100 and depended more on site specific factors, such as fencing and gateways on livestock farms, rather than on wetland size or design. Wetlands with lower trapping rates would also have lower maintenance costs, as dredging would be required less frequently. The results indicate that field wetlands show promise for inclusion in agri-environment schemes, particularly if capital payments can be provided for establishment, to encourage uptake of these multi-functional features.

Fenced in: Common property struggles in the management of communal rangelands in central Eastern Cape Province, South Africa

This paper takes as its starting point the assertion that current rangeland management in the central Eastern Cape Province (former Ciskei) of South Africa, is characterised primarily by an ‘open access’ approach. Empirical material drawn from three case-study communities in the region is used to examine the main barriers to management of rangeland as a ‘commons’. The general inability to define and enforce rights to particular grazing resourses in the face of competing claims from ‘outsiders’, as well as inadequate local institutions responsible for rangeland management are highlighted as being of key importance. These are often exacerbated by lack of available grazing land, diffuse user groups and local political and ethnic divisions. Many of these problems have a strong legacy in historical apartheid policies such as forced resettlement and betterment planning. On this basis it is argued that policy should focus on facilitating the emergence of effective, local institutions for rangeland management. Given the limited grazing available to many communities in the region, a critical aspect of this will be finding ways to legitimise current patterns of extensive resource use, which traverse existing ‘community’ boundaries. However, this runs counter to recent legislation, which strongly links community management with legal ownership of land within strict boundaries often defined through fencing. Finding ways to overcome this apparent disjuncture between theory and policy will be vital for the effective management of common pool grazing resources in the region.

Allocating community-level payments for ecosystem services initial experiences from a REDD pilot in Tanzania

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) typically reward landowners for managing their land to provide ecosystem services that would not otherwise be provided. REDD—Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation—is a form of PES aimed at decreasing carbon emissions from forest conversion and extraction in lower-income countries. A key challenge for REDD occurs when it is implemented at the community rather than the individual landowner level. Whilst achieving this community-level reduction relies on individuals changing their interaction with the forest, incentives are not aligned explicitly at the individual level. Rather, payments are made to the community as a single entity in exchange for verified reduced forest loss, as per a PES scheme. In this paper, we explore how community level REDD has been implemented in one multiple-village pilot in Tanzania. Our findings suggest that considerable attention has been paid to monitoring, reporting, verification, and equity. Though no explicit mechanism ensures individual compliance with the group PES, the development of village level institutions, “social fencing,” and a shared future through equal REDD payments factor into community decisions that influence the level of community compliance that the program will eventually achieve. However, few villages allocate funds for explicit enforcement efforts to protect the forest from illegal activities undertaken by outsiders.