Aphidius ervi preferentially attacks the green morph of the pea aphid, Acyrthosiphon pisum

The pea aphid, Acyrthosiphon pisum Harris (Hemiptera: Aphididae) is found in red and green color morphs. Previous work has suggested that the aphidiine parasitoid Aphidius ervi Haliday preferentially attacks green pea aphids in the field. It is not clear whether these results reflect a real preference, or some unknown clonal difference, such as in immunity, between the aphids used in the previous studies. We used three susceptibility-matched pairs of red and green morph pea aphid clones to test for preferences. In a no-choice situation, the parasitoids attacked equal proportions of each color morph. When provided with a choice, A. ervi was significantly more likely to oviposit into colonies formed from green morphs when the neighboring colony was formed from red morph aphids. In contrast, red morphs were less likely to be attacked when their neighboring colony was of the green morph. By preferentially attacking green colonies, A. ervi may reduce the likelihood of intraguild predation, as it is suggested that visually foraging predators preferentially attack red aphid colonies. Furthermore, if this host choice behavior is replicated in the field, we speculate that color morphs of the pea aphid may interact indirectly through their shared natural enemies, leading to intraspecific apparent competition.

Increasing detection rate of user-to-root attacks using genetic algorithms

An extensive set of machine learning and pattern classification techniques trained and tested on KDD dataset failed in detecting most of the user-to-root attacks. This paper aims to provide an approach for mitigating negative aspects of the mentioned dataset, which led to low detection rates. Genetic algorithm is employed to implement rules for detecting various types of attacks. Rules are formed of the features of the dataset identified as the most important ones for each attack type. In this way we introduce high level of generality and thus achieve high detection rates, but also gain high reduction of the system training time. Thenceforth we re-check the decision of the user-to- root rules with the rules that detect other types of attacks. In this way we decrease the false-positive rate. The model was verified on KDD 99, demonstrating higher detection rates than those reported by the state- of-the-art while maintaining low false-positive rate.

A qualified defense of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan under international humanitarian law

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international law has had to grapple with the fundamental challenges that large-scale violence carried out by non-State actors poses to the traditional inter- State orientation of international law. Questions related to the “adequacy” and “effectiveness” of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law related to the use of force have been particularly pronounced. This paper focuses on the international humanitarian law implications of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan. A highly-advanced modality of modern warfare, armed drones highlight the possibilities, problems, prospects and pitfalls of high-tech warfare. How is the battlefield to be defined and delineated geographically and temporally? Who can be targeted, and by whom? Ultimately, this paper concludes that American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan are not unlawful as such under international humanitarian law, though, like any tactical decision in the context of asymmetric warfare, they should be continuously and closely monitored according to the dictates of law with sensitivity to facts on the ground.

Robust multimodal face and fingerprint fusion in the presence of spoofing attacks

Anti-spoofing is attracting growing interest in biometrics, considering the variety of fake materials and new means to attack biometric recognition systems. New unseen materials continuously challenge state-of-the-art spoofing detectors, suggesting for additional systematic approaches to target anti-spoofing. By incorporating liveness scores into the biometric fusion process, recognition accuracy can be enhanced, but traditional sum-rule based fusion algorithms are known to be highly sensitive to single spoofed instances. This paper investigates 1-median filtering as a spoofing-resistant generalised alternative to the sum-rule targeting the problem of partial multibiometric spoofing where m out of n biometric sources to be combined are attacked. Augmenting previous work, this paper investigates the dynamic detection and rejection of livenessrecognition pair outliers for spoofed samples in true multi-modal configuration with its inherent challenge of normalisation. As a further contribution, bootstrap aggregating (bagging) classifiers for fingerprint spoof-detection algorithm is presented. Experiments on the latest face video databases (Idiap Replay- Attack Database and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database), and fingerprint spoofing database (Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition 2013) illustrate the efficiency of proposed techniques.