The unpatriotism of the economic constitution? Rights to free movement and their impact on national and European identity

Abstract: Instead of the political reading of the EU Constitution adopted by advocates of constitutional patriotism, this article examines the European economic constitution. The four single market freedoms can be used by the Court of Justice to strike down Member State laws which represent deeply held aspects of national cultural identity. The article examines whether the court does in fact act in this way and proceeds to argue that the issue of identity protection does not stop with the court. In those policy areas where the court is more interventionist, and its case-law is perceived as an identity threat, one is likely to find binding Treaty-based derogations. Where, in contrast, the effect of the court's case-law poses less of a threat, one is more likely to see non-binding declarations. The article examines a number of policy areas in which specific cultural derogations and declarations are to be found, including abortion, property acquisition, football and alcohol control.

State practice, customary humanitarian law and civilian casualties of armed conflict

The article examines the customary international law credentials of the humanitarian law rules proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICR) in 2005. It relies on the BIICL/Chatham House analysis as a ‘constructive comment’ on the methodology of the ICRC study and the rules formed as a result of that methodology with respect to the dead and missing as an aid to determination of their customary law status. It shows that most of the rules studied have a customary international lawpedigree which conforms to the conclusions formed on the rules generally in the Wilmshurst and Breau study. However, the rules with respect to return of personal effects, recording location of graves and notification of relatives of access to gravesites do not seem to have even on a majoritarian/deductive approach enough volume of state practice to establish them as customary with respect to civilians.

EU free movement law and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships: the case for mutual recognition

This article seeks to examine the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the EU. Although the Member States maintain an exclusive competence in the field of family law and, thus, it is up to them to determine whether they will provide a legal status to same-sex couples within their territory, they need to exercise their powers in that field in a way that does not violate EU law. This, it is suggested, requires that Member States mutually recognize the legal status of same-sex couples and do not treat same-sex couples worse than opposite-sex couples, if the basis of the differentiation is, merely, the (homosexual) sexual orientation of the two spouses/partners. Nonetheless, the current legal framework does not make it clear that Member States are under such an obligation. The main argument of the article, therefore, is that the EU must adopt a more hands-on approach towards this issue.

The Léger ruling as another example of the ECJ’s disappointingly reticent approach to the protection of the rights of LGB persons under EU law

In the 1980s, in the midst of the AIDS epidemic, many countries introduced lifetime bans on blood donations by men who had sexual relations with men (MSM). These blanket bans have, recently, begun to be challenged and, as a result, many countries have either relaxed them or completely abolished them. The case under examination (Léger ) is another instance of questioning the legality of such a ban. In particular, in this case, the European Court of Justice was called on to rule on whether a measure such as the French lifetime exclusion from blood donation of the MSM population that was at issue before the referring court is contrary to EU law. The Court ruled that although discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation, such a ban may be justified in certain circumstances, and left it to the national court to make the final decision. This article seeks to analyse the case and to explain why, in the author’s view, the Court can be accused of—once more—not going far enough in the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) rights.