Reference fallible endgame play

A reference model of fallible endgame play is defined in terms of a spectrum of endgame players whose play ranges in competence from random to optimal choice of move. They may be used as suitable practice partners, to differentiate between otherwise equi-optimal moves, to promote or expedite a result, to assess an opponent, to run Monte Carlo simulations, and to identify the difficulty of a position or a whole endgame.

An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.