Do expert drivers have a reduced illusion of superiority?

It is well established that people tend to rate themselves as better than average across many domains. To maintain these illusions, it is suggested that people distort feedback about their own and others' performance. This study examined expert/novice differences in self-ratings when people compared themselves with others of the same level of expertise and background as themselves. Given that a key expert characteristic is increased self-monitoring, we predicted that experts in a domain may have a reduced illusion of superiority because they are more aware of their actual ability. We compared expert police drivers with novice police drivers and found that this prediction was not supported. Expert police drivers rated themselves as superior to equally qualified drivers, to the same degree as novices, Cohen's d = .03 ns. Despite their extensive additional training and experience, experts still appear to be as susceptible to illusions of superiority Lis everyone else. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Regulation of the neural circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: effects of meditative expertise

Recent brain imaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have implicated insula and anterior cingulate cortices in the empathic response to another's pain. However, virtually nothing is known about the impact of the voluntary generation of compassion on this network. To investigate these questions we assessed brain activity using fMRI while novice and expert meditation practitioners generated a loving-kindness-compassion meditation state. To probe affective reactivity, we presented emotional and neutral sounds during the meditation and comparison periods. Our main hypothesis was that the concern for others cultivated during this form of meditation enhances affective processing, in particular in response to sounds of distress, and that this response to emotional sounds is modulated by the degree of meditation training. The presentation of the emotional sounds was associated with increased pupil diameter and activation of limbic regions (insula and cingulate cortices) during meditation (versus rest). During meditation, activation in insula was greater during presentation of negative sounds than positive or neutral sounds in expert than it was in novice meditators. The strength of activation in insula was also associated with self-reported intensity of the meditation for both groups. These results support the role of the limbic circuitry in emotion sharing. The comparison between meditation vs. rest states between experts and novices also showed increased activation in amygdala, right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in response to all sounds, suggesting, greater detection of the emotional sounds, and enhanced mentation in response to emotional human vocalizations for experts than novices during meditation. Together these data indicate that the mental expertise to cultivate positive emotion alters the activation of circuitries previously linked to empathy and theory of mind in response to emotional stimuli.

Experience and real estate investment decision-making: a process-tracing investigation

This study investigates the impact of experience upon trained behaviours in real estate investment decision‐making. In a controlled experiment design, two groups of subjects, experts and novices, conduct an evaluation and reach a decision about two investment options. Using a process‐tracing technique, each subject’s behaviour is observed and recorded. Differences between the groups are discovered in relation to some behaviour characteristics, but experience appears not to impact all behaviours. These findings are discussed in relation to the current absence of a universal normative model of real estate investment decision‐making. In an associated component of the study, the belief that monetary compensation is needed in order to render valid results from studies such as this is tested. We find this not to be the case.

Altered anterior insula activation during anticipation and experience of painful stimuli in expert meditators.

Experientially opening oneself to pain rather than avoiding it is said to reduce the mind's tendency toward avoidance or anxiety which can further exacerbate the experience of pain. This is a central feature of mindfulness-based therapies. Little is known about the neural mechanisms of mindfulness on pain. During a meditation practice similar to mindfulness, functional magnetic resonance imaging was used in expert meditators (> 10,000 h of practice) to dissociate neural activation patterns associated with pain, its anticipation, and habituation. Compared to novices, expert meditators reported equal pain intensity, but less unpleasantness. This difference was associated with enhanced activity in the dorsal anterior insula (aI), and the anterior mid-cingulate (aMCC) the so-called ‘salience network’, for experts during pain. This enhanced activity during pain was associated with reduced baseline activity before pain in these regions and the amygdala for experts only. The reduced baseline activation in left aI correlated with lifetime meditation experience. This pattern of low baseline activity coupled with high response in aIns and aMCC was associated with enhanced neural habituation in amygdala and pain-related regions before painful stimulation and in the pain-related regions during painful stimulation. These findings suggest that cultivating experiential openness down-regulates anticipatory representation of aversive events, and increases the recruitment of attentional resources during pain, which is associated with faster neural habituation.

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.