Looking in the wrong place for healthcare improvements: a system dynamics study of an accident and emergency department

Accident and Emergency (A&E) units provide a route for patients requiring urgent admission to acute hospitals. Public concern over long waiting times for admissions motivated this study, whose aim is to explore the factors which contribute to such delays. The paper discusses the formulation and calibration of a system dynamics model of the interaction of demand pattern, A&E resource deployment, other hospital processes and bed numbers; and the outputs of policy analysis runs of the model which vary a number of the key parameters. Two significant findings have policy implications. One is that while some delays to patients are unavoidable, reductions can be achieved by selective augmentation of resources within, and relating to, the A&E unit. The second is that reductions in bed numbers do not increase waiting times for emergency admissions, their effect instead being to increase sharply the number of cancellations of admissions for elective surgery. This suggests that basing A&E policy solely on any single criterion will merely succeed in transferring the effects of a resource deficit to a different patient group.

Self-exclusion from health care in women at high risk for postpartum depression

Background A significant proportion of women who are vulnerable to postnatal depression refuse to engage in treatment programmes. Little is known about them, other than some general demographic characteristics. In particular, their access to health care and their own and their infants' health outcomes are uncharted. Methods We conducted a nested cohort case-control study, using data from computerized health systems, and general practitioner (GP) and maternity records, to identify the characteristics, health service contacts, and maternal and infant health outcomes for primiparous antenatal clinic attenders at high risk for postnatal depression who either refused (self-exclusion group) or else agreed (take-up group) to receive additional Health Visiting support in pregnancy and the first 2 months postpartum. Results Women excluding themselves from Health Visitor support were younger and less highly educated than women willing to take up the support. They were less likely to attend midwifery, GP and routine Health Visitor appointments, but were more likely to book in late and to attend accident and emergency department (A&E). Their infants had poorer outcome in terms of gestation, birthweight and breastfeeding. Differences between the groups still obtained when age and education were taken into account for midwifery contacts, A&E attendance and gestation;the difference in the initiation of breast feeding was attenuated, but not wholly explained, by age and education. Conclusion A subgroup of psychologically vulnerable childbearing women are at particular risk for poor access to health care and adverse infant outcome. Barriers to take-up of services need to be understood in order better to deliver care.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.