The British ‘failure’ that never was? The Anglo-American ‘productivity gap’ in large-scale interwar retailing—evidence from the department store sector

Interwar British retailing has been characterized as having lower productivity, less developed managerial hierarchies and methods, and weaker scale economies than its US counterpart. This article examines comparative productivity for one major segment of large-scale retailing in both countries—the department store sector. Drawing on exceptionally detailed contemporary survey data, we show that British department stores in fact achieved superior performance in terms of operating costs, margins, profits, and stock-turn. While smaller British stores had lower labour productivity than US stores of equivalent size, TFP was generally higher for British stores, which also enjoyed stronger scale economies. We also examine the reasons behind Britain's surprisingly strong relative performance, using surviving original returns from the British surveys. Contrary to arguments that British retailers faced major barriers to the development of large-scale enterprises, that could reap economies of scale and scope and invest in machinery and marketing to support the growth of their primary sales functions, we find that British department stores enthusiastically embraced the retail ‘managerial revolution’—and reaped substantial benefits from this investment.

Accounting for the economic risk, caused by variation in disease severity, in fungicide dose decisions: exemplified for Mycosphaerella graminicola on winter wheat

A method is presented to calculate economic optimum fungicide doses accounting for the risk-aversion of growers responding to variability in disease severity between crops. Simple dose-response and disease-yield loss functions are used to estimate net disease-related costs (fungicide cost, plus disease-induced yield loss) as a function of dose and untreated severity. With fairly general assumptions about the shapes of the probability distribution of disease severity and the other functions involved, we show that a choice of fungicide dose which minimises net costs on average across seasons results in occasional large net costs caused by inadequate control in high disease seasons. This may be unacceptable to a grower with limited capital. A risk-averse grower can choose to reduce the size and frequency of such losses by applying a higher dose as insurance. For example, a grower may decide to accept ‘high loss’ years one year in ten or one year in twenty (i.e. specifying a proportion of years in which disease severity and net costs will be above a specified level). Our analysis shows that taking into account disease severity variation and risk-aversion will usually increase the dose applied by an economically rational grower. The analysis is illustrated with data on septoria tritici leaf blotch of wheat caused by Mycosphaerella graminicola. Observations from untreated field plots at sites across England over three years were used to estimate the probability distribution of disease severities at mid-grain filling. In the absence of a fully reliable disease forecasting scheme, reducing the frequency of ‘high loss’ years requires substantially higher doses to be applied to all crops. Disease resistant cultivars reduce both the optimal dose at all levels of risk and the disease-related costs at all doses.

Greek politics: economic crisis or crisis of democracy?

Greece’s economic instability has become the Western world’s longest-running monetary crisis. Will Germany allow the EU to keep propping up Greece’s unstable financial system? Will the country leave the eurozone? Will such a departure, if it occurs, unravel the idea of “Europe”? All valid questions. But behind them stands another equally profound social and political crisis that has made Greece the weak man of Europe.

Entrepreneurial failure and economic crisis: an historical perspective

This chapter analyses the major UK economic crises that have occurred since the speculative bubbles of the seventeenth century. It integrates insights from economic history and business history to analyse both the general economic conditions and the specific business and financial practices that led to these crises. The analysis suggests a significant reinterpretation of the evidence – one that questions economists’ conventional views.