Critical success factors in urban brownfield regeneration: an analysis of ‘hardcore’ sites in Manchester and Osaka during the economic recession (2009–10)

Hardcore, or long-term derelict and vacant brownfield sites which are often contaminated, form a significant proportion of brownfield land in many cities, not only in the UK but also in other countries. The recent economic recession has placed the economic viability of such sites in jeopardy. This paper compares the approaches for bringing back hardcore brownfield sites into use in England and Japan by focusing on ten case studies in Manchester and Osaka, using an `agency'-based frame- work. The findings are set in the context of (i) national brownfield and related policy agendas; (ii) recent trends in land and property markets in both England and Japan; and (iii) city-level comparisons of brownfields in Manchester and Osaka. The research, which was conducted during 2009 ^ 10, suggests that hardcore brownfield sites have been badly affected by the recent recession in both Manchester and Osaka. Despite this, not only is there evidence that hardcore sites have been successfully regenerated in both cities, but also that the critical success factors (CSFs) operating in bringing sites back into use share a large degree of commonality. These CSFs include the presence of strong potential markets, seeing the recession as an opportunity, long-term vision, strong branding, strong partnerships, integrated development, and getting infrastructure into place. Finally, the paper outlines the policy implications of the research.

What next for children's services? Can policy at a local or national level have any significant impact on the outcomes for children and their families?

In England at both strategic and operational levels, policy-makers in the public sector have undertaken considerable work on implementing the findings of the Every Child Matters report and subsequently through the Children's Act 2004. Legislation has resulted in many local authorities seeking to implement more holistic approaches to the delivery of children's services. At a strategic level this is demonstrated by the creation of integrated directorate structures providing for a range of services, from education to children's social care. Such services were generally under the management of the Director of Children's Services, holding statutory responsibilities for the delivery of services formally divided into the three sectors of education, health and social services. At a national level, more fundamental policy developments have sought to establish a framework through which policy-makers can address the underlying causes of deprivation, vulnerability and inequality. The Child Poverty Act, 2010, which gained Royal Assent in 2010, provides for a clear intention to reduce the number of children in poverty, acknowledging that ‘the best way to eradicate child poverty is to address the causes of poverty, rather than only treat the symptoms’. However, whilst the policy objectives of both pieces of legislation hold positive aspirations for children and young people, a change of policy direction through a change of government in May 2010 seems to be in direct contrast to the intended focus of these aims. This paper explores the impact of new government policy on the future direction of children's services both at the national and local levels. At the national level, we question the ability of the government to deliver the aspirations of the Child Poverty Act, 2010, given the broad range of influences and factors that can determine the circumstances in which a child may experience poverty. We argue that poverty is not simply an issue of the pressure of financial deprivation, but that economic recession and cuts in government spending will further increase the number of children living in poverty.

Resilience planning, economic change and the politics of post-recession development in London and Hong Kong

For much of the 1990s and 2000s, the emphasis of urban policy in many global cities was on managing and mitigating the social and environmental effects of rapid economic growth. The credit crunch of 2008 and the subsequent recession have undermined some of the core assumptions on which such policies were based. It is in this context that the concept of resilience planning has taken on a new significance. Drawing on contemporary research in London and Hong Kong, the paper shows how resilience and recovery planning has become a key area of political debate. It examines what is meant by conservative and radical interpretations of resilience and how conservative views have come to dominate ‘recovery’ thinking, with élite groups unwilling to accept the limits to the neo-liberal orthodoxies that helped to precipitate the economic crisis. The paper explores the implications of such thinking for the politics of urban development.

The politics of fiscal policy during economic downturns, 1981-2010

This article investigates fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession in historical perspective. We explore general trends in the frequency, size and composition of fiscal stimulus as well as the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the four international recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91, 2001-02 and 2008-09. Encompassing 17-23 OECD countries, our analysis calls into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism since the early 1980s. The propensity of governments to respond to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has increased over time and we do not observe any secular trend in the size of stimulus measures. At the same time, OECD governments have relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the two recessions of the 2000s than they did in the early 1980s or early 1990s. Regarding government partisanship, we do not find any significant direct partisan effects on either the size or the composition of fiscal stimulus for any of the four recession episodes. However, the size of the welfare state conditioned the impact of government partisanship in the two recessions of the 2000s, with Left-leaning governments distinctly more prone to engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus and/or spending increases in large welfare states, but not in small welfare states.