Cities’ low carbon plans in an ‘age of austerity’: an analysis of UK local authority actions, attitudes and responses

Background: Cities play a significant role globally in creating carbon emissions but, as centers of major population, innovation and social practice, they also offer important opportunities to tackle climate change. The new challenges faced by cities in an ‘age of austerity’ and decentralist agendas present substantial challenges for coordinated multilevel governance. Results: Based on research carried out in 2011–2012, this paper examines the attitudes and responses of sustainability and climate change officers in UK cities that have prepared low carbon and climate change plans, in the context of these challenges. Using a conceptual framework that analyses ‘awareness’, ‘analysis’ and ‘actions’ (in the context of spending cuts and a new ‘decentralized’ policy agenda) this research suggests that progress on low-carbon futures for cities continues to be fragmented, with increased funding constraints, short-termism and lack of leadership acting as key barriers to progress. Conclusion: Recent UK national policies (including localism, austerity measures and new economic incentives) have not only created further uncertainties, but also scope for cities’ local innovation through policy leverage and self-governing actions.

Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. Behavioral insights from a natural field experiment

The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.

Are local economic development incentives promoting job growth? An empirical case study

At a time when cities are competing with one another to attract or retain jobs within a globalizing economy, city governments are providing an array of financial incentives to stimulate job growth and retain existing jobs, particularly in high cost locations. This paper provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of datasets on economic development incentives in New York City over the last fifteen years. The evidence on job retention and creation is mixed. Although many companies do not meet their agreed-upon job targets in absolute terms, the evidence suggests that companies receiving subsidies outperform their respective industries in terms of employment growth, that is, the grow more, or decline less. We emphasize that this finding is difficult to interpret, since firms receiving incentives may not be representative of the industry as a whole. In other words, their above-average performance may simply reflect the fact that the Economic Development Corporation (EDC) selects economically promising companies within manufacturing (or other industries) when granting incentives. At the same time, it is also possible that receiving incentives helps these companies to become stronger.

Biosecurity in agriculture: an economic analysis of coexistence of professional and hobby production

One component of biosecurity is protection against invasive alien species, which are one of the most important threats worldwide to native biodiversity and economic profitability in various sectors, including agriculture. However, agricultural producers are not homogeneous. They may have different objectives and priorities, use different technologies, and occupy heterogeneous parcels of land. If the producers differ in terms of their attitude towards invasive pests and the damages they cause, there are probably external effects in the form of pest spread impacts and subsequent damages caused. We study such impacts in the case of two producer types: profit-seeking professional producers and utility-seeking hobby producers. We show that the hobby producer, having first set a breeding ground for the pest, under-invests in pest control. We also discuss potential policy instruments to correct this market failure and highlight the importance of considering different stakeholders and their heterogeneous incentives when designing policies to control invasive alien species.

Economic models and algorithms for distributed systems

Distributed computing paradigms for sharing resources such as Clouds, Grids, Peer-to-Peer systems, or voluntary computing are becoming increasingly popular. While there are some success stories such as PlanetLab, OneLab, BOINC, BitTorrent, and SETI@home, a widespread use of these technologies for business applications has not yet been achieved. In a business environment, mechanisms are needed to provide incentives to potential users for participating in such networks. These mechanisms may range from simple non-monetary access rights, monetary payments to specific policies for sharing. Although a few models for a framework have been discussed (in the general area of a "Grid Economy"), none of these models has yet been realised in practice. This book attempts to fill this gap by discussing the reasons for such limited take-up and exploring incentive mechanisms for resource sharing in distributed systems. The purpose of this book is to identify research challenges in successfully using and deploying resource sharing strategies in open-source and commercial distributed systems.

The role of incentives for sustainable implementation of marine protected areas: an example from Tanzania

Although Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are an increasingly popular policy tool for protecting marine stocks and biodiversity, they pose high costs for small-scale fisherfolk in poor countries. With Tanzania’s Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park as an example, we develop a spatial economic decision-modelling framework as a lens to examine fishers’ reactions to incentives created by an MPA. We argue that MPAs in poor countries can only contribute to sustainability if management induces changes in incentives to fish through a combination of enforcement (‘sticks’) and livelihood projects (‘carrots’). We emphasise practical implementation issues and implications for fostering marine ecosystem sustainability.