Consumption and social identity: evidence from India

We examine spending on consumption items which have signaling value in social interactions across groups with distinctive social identities in India, where social identities are defined by caste and religious affiliations. Using nationally representative micro data on household consumption expenditures, we find that disadvantaged caste groups such as Other Backward Castes spend 8 percent more on visible consumption than Brahmin and High Caste groups while social groups such as Muslims spend 14 percent less, after controlling for differences in permanent income, household assets and household demographic composition. The differences across social groups are significant and robust and these differences persist within different sub populations. We find that the higher spending of OBC households on visible consumption is diverted from education spending, while Muslim households divert spending from visible consumption and education towards greater food spending. Additionally, we find that these consumption patterns can be partly explained as a result of the status signaling nature of the consumption items. We also discuss alternative sources of differences in consumption patterns across groups which stem from religious observance.

Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes

We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects' risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.

Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test

We apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players’ behavior in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes.

Contract cheating & the market in essays

We conduct the first empirical economic investigation of the decision to cheat by University students. We investigate student demand for essays, using hypothetical discrete choice experiments in conjunction with consequential Holt-Laury gambles to derive subjects risk preferences. Students stated willingness to participate in the essay market, and their valuation of purchased essays, vary with the characteristics of student and institutional environment. Risk preferring students, those working in a non-native language, and those believing they will attain a lower grade are willing to pay more. Purchase likelihoods and essay valuations decline as the probability of detection and associated penalty increase.

Choosing international linkage strategies in the electronics industry: the role of multinational experience

This paper examines how different aspects of multinational experience affect the choice of international linkage strategy. Integrating transaction cost and dynamic efficiency considerations, we empirically test the determinants of the choice between acquisitions, joint ventures (JV), and strategic alliances (SA) for the world’s largest electronics corporations in 1993–1997. We show that “country specific experience” increases the probability of commitment intensive linkage modes (such as acquisitions and joint ventures), while a positive effect on strategic alliances is caused by “variety experience”, deriving from the heterogeneity of international contexts, and by “internationalisation experience” reflecting overall involvement in international markets.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.