Social equality in the number of choice options is represented in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex

A distinct aspect of the sense of fairness in humans is that we care not only about equality in material rewards but also about equality in non-material values. One such value is the opportunity to choose freely among many options, often regarded as a fundamental right to economic freedom. In modern developed societies, equal opportunities in work, living, and lifestyle are enforced by anti-discrimination laws. Despite the widespread endorsement of equal opportunity, no studies have explored how people assign value to it. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural substrates for subjective valuation of equality in choice opportunity. Participants performed a two-person choice task in which the number of choices available was varied across trials independently of choice outcomes. By using this procedure, we manipulated the degree of equality in choice opportunity between players and dissociated it from the value of reward outcomes and their equality. We found that activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracked the degree to which the number of options between the two players was equal. In contrast, activation in the ventral striatum tracked the number of options available to participants themselves but not the equality between players. Our results demonstrate that the vmPFC, a key brain region previously implicated in the processing of social values, is also involved in valuation of equality in choice opportunity between individuals. These findings may provide valuable insight into the human ability to value equal opportunity, a characteristic long emphasized in politics, economics, and philosophy.

Heritage property, tourism and the UK Disability Discrimination Act

Heritage tourism depends on a physical resource based primarily on listed buildings and scheduled monuments. Visiting or staying in a historic building provides a rich tourism experience, but historic environments date from eras when access for disabled people was not a consideration. Current UK Government policy now promotes social inclusion via an array of equal opportunities, widening participation and anti-discrimination policies. Historic environments enjoy considerable legislative protection from adverse change, but now need to balance conservation with public access for all. This paper discusses the basis of research being undertaken by The College of Estate Management funded by the Mercers Company of London and the Harold Samuel Trust. It assesses how the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act has changed the legal obligations of owners/operators in managing access to listed buildings in tourism use. It also examines the key stakeholders and power structures in the management of historic buildings and distinguishes other important players in the management process.

Framing the local and the global in the anti-nuclear movement: Law and the politics of place

This article examines the politics of place in relation to legal mobilization by the anti-nuclear movement. It examines two case examples - citizens' weapons inspections and civil disobedience strategies - which have involved the movement drawing upon the law in particular spatial contexts. The article begins by examining a number of factors which have been employed in recent social movement literature to explain strategy choice, including ideology, resources, political and legal opportunity, and framing. It then proceeds to argue that the issues of scale, space, and place play an important role in relation to framing by the movement in the two case examples. Both can be seen to involve scalar reframing, with the movement attempting to resist localizing tendencies and to replace them with a global frame. Both also involve an attempt to reframe the issue of nuclear weapons away from the contested frame of the past (unilateral disarmament) towards the more universal and widely accepted frame of international law.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.

Redefining the outer boundaries of EU Law: the Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci trilogy

In its three recent rulings in the cases of Zambrano, McCarthy, and Dereci, the Court appears to have been determined to redefine the external boundaries of EU law, in cases involving the family reunification rights of Union citizens.These three judgments can be read as an indication that for Article 20 TFEU to apply, there is no longer a requirement of a cross-border element on the facts of the case, and that it is sufficient if the contested national measure has the effect of ‘depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of their rights (the ‘Zambrano principle’).The cases can, at the same time, also be read as a confirmation that the free movement provisions do – still – require a cross-border element and, in particular, the exercise of inter-State movement, in order to apply. Though the result in these cases has not been entirely unexpected, especially in the aftermath of the Rottmann ruling, it is rather problematic in that, although it is obvious that the Court wishes to redraw the line dividing the national and EU spheres of competence, it does not make it entirely clear where this line now lies and leaves many essential questions unanswered, which will obviously require some time to be resolved. EU lawyers are consequently, once more, left with having to decipher as best as they can the real intentions of the Court in this new line of case-law, which has been further complicated by the fact that what the Court seems to have given with one hand in Zambrano (and before that in Rottmann), has taken it back to a large extent through its rulings in McCarthy and Dereci, which appear to confine the former two cases to their own exceptional facts.6 Moreover, the ‘reverse discrimination Pandora’s box’, the opening of which appears to have been the real target of these references, remains untouched: instead of providing a direct solution to this problem, the Court has chosen to – once again – broaden the scope of the Treaty provisions in order to include within it as many situations as possible and, thus, prevent the emergence of this type of differential treatment on a case-by-case basis.As will be explained, nonetheless, this is by no means an appropriate solution to the reverse discrimination conundrum.