International public goods through integrated natural resources management research in CGIAR partnerships

The CGIAR System conducts research to produce international public goods (IPG) that are of wide applicability creating a scientific base which speeds and broadens local adaptive development. Integrated natural resources management (INRM) research is sometimes seen to be very location specific and consequently does not lend itself readily to the production of IPGs. In this paper we analyse ways in which strategic approaches to INRM research can have broad international applicability and serve as useful foundations for the development of locally adapted technologies. The paper describes the evolution of the IPG concept within the CGIAR and elaborates on five major types of IPGs that have been generated from a varied set of recent INRM research efforts. CGIAR networks have both strengths and weaknesses in INRM research and application, with enormous differences in relative research and development capacities, responsibilities and data access of its partners, making programme process evolution critical to acceptance and participation. Many of the lessons learnt regarding challenges and corresponding IPG research approaches are relevant to designing and managing future multi-scale, multi-locational, coordinated INRM programmes involving broad-based partnerships to address complex environmental and livelihood problems for development.

Entrepreneurial opportunities, implicit contracts and market making for complex consumer goods

This article extends the theory of entrepreneurial opportunity exploitation, outlining how under certain conditions, opportunity exploitation is dependent on market making innovations. Where adverse selection and moral hazard characterize markets, consumers are likely to withdraw regardless of product quality. In order to overcome consumer resistance, entrepreneurs must signal credible commitments. But because consumers purchase without fully specifying requirements, entrepreneurs' commitments take the partial form of implicit contracts, creating strong mutual commitments to repeated transactions. These commitments enable novel markets to function, but introduce additional costs. This article illustrates the theory with the historic case of Singer in sewing machines

The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.

Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods

Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation

Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alleviates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altruistic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolution. Here, we investigate – both experimentally (using bacteria) and theoretically – how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition to recovering the well-known theoretical result that the optimal level of dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high, the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout available patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.

Shops, stalls, stores: pre-consumption deposits and centrally organised distribution in Antonine Britain

Michael Fulford writes: Recent research is shedding more light on how certain goods, particularly durable materials like pottery, were distributed in the Western provinces of the Roman Empire and on the steps which connected producer with consumer.15 This paper develops the theme further by exploring the contribution to the debate of three British sites with Antonine assemblages of unused pottery and other goods. While interest has previously focused on the samian because of the contribution that it can make to dating, this paper considers the implications of the assemblages as a whole.