Developments in the Doha Round and WTO dispute settlement: some implications for EU agricultural policy

Progress in the Doha Round is assessed against the changes to the common agricultural policy (CAP) brought about by the Fischler reforms of 2003-2004, and that proposed for sugar. An elimination of export subsidies could place EU exports of processed foods at a competitive disadvantage because of high sugar and milk prices. Provided the single payment scheme falls within the green box, the likely new limits on domestic support should not be problematic for the post-Fischler CAP. However, an ambitious market access package could open up EU markets and bring pressure for further reform. If there is no Doha agreement, existing provisions will continue to apply, but without the protection of the Peace Clause; and increased litigation is likely. Further CAP reform is to be expected.

The 2002 US Farm Bill: what's in it for CAP reform?

The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill (the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act or FSRIA) provides considerably more government subsidies for U.S. agriculture than Congress envisaged when it passed the preceding 1996–2002 FAIR Act. We review the FAIR record, showing how government subsidies increased greatly beyond those originally scheduled. For FSRIA, we outline key commodity, trade, and conservation and environmental provisions. We expect that the commodity programmes will: (a) encourage production when the market calls for less; (b) significantly increase subsidies over FAIR baseline subsidies; (c) press against current WTO and possible Doha Round support limits; and (d) aggravate trading partners. Finally, we suggest two lessons from the U.S. policy experience that might benefit those working on CAP and WTO reform. First, past research shows that farm programmes have little to do with the economic health of rural communities. Second, programme transparency, and especially public disclosure of the level of payments going to individual farmers, by name, influences the farm policy debate. Personalized data show what economists have long maintained—that the bulk of programme benefits go to a relatively few, large, producers—but do so in a way that captures the public and policy-makers' attention

Potential WTO challenges to the CAP

Since the early 1990s the EU's CAP has undergone considerable change with, first, a switch from market price support to direct payments in 1992 and, second, a further decoupling of support with the creation of the single payment scheme in 2003. Nonetheless, whether the current Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations is successfully completed or not, the CAP will come under renewed scrutiny, as a result either of negotiated reductions in support or of litigation through the WTO's dispute settlement process. This article discusses CAP market price and income support in the context of these likely WTO constraints.

European Union: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications

The notification of the level of domestic support to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is intended to reflect compliance with obligations entered into at the time of the Uruguay Round. WTO members have often been slow to provide notification of domestic support levels. This makes the process of notification less useful as an indicator of the degree to which changes in policy have or have not benefited the trade system as a whole and exporting countries in particular. The notification of domestic support in the E.U. illustrates the value of a measure that reflects current policies and can therefore act as a basis for negotiation of further disciplines where these are necessary. The E.U. has made major changes in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the period since 1992 when the MacSharry reforms were implemented. Payments originally notified in the blue box (related to supply control) have over time been changed until in their present form they are unrelated to current production or price levels, and hence can satisfy the criteria for the green box. The E.U. has therefore much more latitude in trade talks to agree to reductions in the allowable trade-distorting support. This paper reproduced the E.U. notifications relating to 2003/04 and extends these with official statistics to the year 2006/07. It then projects forward the components of domestic support until the year 2013/14, based on forecasts of future production and estimates of policy parameters. The impact of a successful Doha Round is simulated, showing that the constraints envisaged in the WTO draft modalities document of May 19, 2008, would be binding by the year 2013, at about the time the next budget cycle in the E.U. starts. Without the Doha Round constraints, further reform might still happen for domestic reasons, but the framework provided by the WTO for domestic policy spending would be less relevant. In that case, much could hinge on the legitimacy of the Single Farm Payment system under the current rules governing the green box.

Explaining the 'health check' of the Common Agricultural Policy: budgetary politics, globalisation and paradigm change revisited

Three potential explanations of past reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be identified in the literature: a budget constraint, pressure from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) negotiations or commitments and a paradigm shift emphasising agriculture’s provision of public goods. This discussion on the driving forces of CAP reform links to broader theoretical questions on the role of budgetary politics, globalisation of public policy and paradigm shift in explaining policy change. In this article, the Health Check reforms of 2007/2008 are assessed. They were probably more ambitious than first supposed, although it was a watered-down package agreed by ministers in November 2008. We conclude that the Health Check was not primarily driven by budget concerns or by the supposed switch from the state-assisted to the multifunctional policy paradigm. The European Commission’s wish to adopt an offensive negotiating stance in the closing phases of the Doha Round was a more likely explanatory factor. The shape and purpose of the CAP post-2013 is contested with divergent views among the Member States.

European Union

Determination of shadow notifications of domestic support for agriculture in the European Union under the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreement on Agriculture, and consideration of the potential impact of an agreement in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Fruit and vegetables, and the role they have played in determining the EU’s aggregate measurement of support

In its periodic declarations of domestic support to the WTO, the EU has progressively reduced its amber-box declarations in line with its changing system of farm support. Surprisingly, however, in 2007/08 it managed to more than halve its amber box compared with that of the previous year, easily achieving the reduction targets being touted in the Doha Round. This was largely due to a change in the calculations for fresh fruits and vegetables. These had been linked to the entry price system, which was not affected by the 2008 fruit and vegetables reform. Why the EU chose to make this change during the ongoing Doha Round negotiations remains unclear.

Another reform? proposals for the post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy

Following two decades of policy change, in 2011 the European Commission tabled proposals for a new ‘reform’ of the CAP. A major component of the reform would be a revamping of the existing system of direct payments to farmers. For example, 30% of the spend would be dependent on farmers respecting new greening criteria; and payments would be restricted to active farmers and subject to a payment cap. These proposals will be debated by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament throughout 2012, and possibly 2013, before final decisions are reached. What aspects, if any, of the proposals will prove acceptable is yet to be discerned. Although tabled as part of a financial package, the proposals do not appear to be driven by financial exigency: indeed they seek to maintain the expenditure status quo. Nor do they appear to be driven by international pressures: if anything, they backtrack on previous attempts to bring the CAP into conformity with a post-Doha WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Instead they seek to establish a new partnership between society and ‘farmers, who keep rural areas alive, who are in contact with the ecosystems and who produce the food we eat’ (Cioloș 2011), in an attempt to justify continuing support.