E-commerce system simulation for construction and demolition waste exchange

This article introduces a quantitative approach to e-commerce system evaluation based on the theory of process simulation. The general concept of e-commerce system simulation is presented based on the considerations of some limitations in e-commerce system development such as the huge amount of initial investments of time and money, and the long period from business planning to system development, then to system test and operation, and finally to exact return; in other words, currently used system analysis and development method cannot tell investors about some keen attentions such as how good their e-commerce system could be, how many investment repayments they could have, and which area they should improve regarding the initial business plan. In order to exam the value and its potential effects of an e-commerce business plan, it is necessary to use a quantitative evaluation approach and the authors of this article believe that process simulation is an appropriate option. The overall objective of this article is to apply the theory of process simulation to e-commerce system evaluation, and the authors will achieve this though an experimental study on a business plan for online construction and demolition waste exchange. The methodologies adopted in this article include literature review, system analysis and development, simulation modelling and analysis, and case study. The results from this article include the concept of e-commerce system simulation, a comprehensive review of simulation methods adopted in e-commerce system evaluation, and a real case study of applying simulation to e-commerce system evaluation. Furthermore, the authors hope that the adoption and implementation of the process simulation approach can effectively support business decision-making, and improve the efficiency of e-commerce systems.

Haldane's Mackindergarten: a radical experiment in British military education

This article critically evaluates a course that was conceived and run at the LSE by Sir Halford Mackinder for officers of the Britsh Army between 1907 and 1932.There is an examination of the nature of the syllabus,the aims and objectives of this course.An explanation is also given as to why the army cut it seven years before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives’

This article draws on Warsaw Treaty Organisation and East German military archives to demonstrate that the WTO's military exercises until the mid-1990s always envisaged an offensive strategy with the aim of reaching the Channel in a few days. Only gradually did this change under Gorbachev and to include also defensive strategies, very much against the opposition of East Germany.

Denial of change: the 'Military Revolution' as seen by contemporaries

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.