Deception-detection and machine intelligence in practical Turing tests

Deception-detection is the crux of Turing’s experiment to examine machine thinking conveyed through a capacity to respond with sustained and satisfactory answers to unrestricted questions put by a human interrogator. However, in 60 years to the month since the publication of Computing Machinery and Intelligence little agreement exists for a canonical format for Turing’s textual game of imitation, deception and machine intelligence. This research raises from the trapped mine of philosophical claims, counter-claims and rebuttals Turing’s own distinct five minutes question-answer imitation game, which he envisioned practicalised in two different ways: a) A two-participant, interrogator-witness viva voce, b) A three-participant, comparison of a machine with a human both questioned simultaneously by a human interrogator. Using Loebner’s 18th Prize for Artificial Intelligence contest, and Colby et al.’s 1972 transcript analysis paradigm, this research practicalised Turing’s imitation game with over 400 human participants and 13 machines across three original experiments. Results show that, at the current state of technology, a deception rate of 8.33% was achieved by machines in 60 human-machine simultaneous comparison tests. Results also show more than 1 in 3 Reviewers succumbed to hidden interlocutor misidentification after reading transcripts from experiment 2. Deception-detection is essential to uncover the increasing number of malfeasant programmes, such as CyberLover, developed to steal identity and financially defraud users in chatrooms across the Internet. Practicalising Turing’s two tests can assist in understanding natural dialogue and mitigate the risk from cybercrime.

Control without deception

Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making “others' behaviour” a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard device, the Random Lottery incentive system. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. The design is implemented in a sequential play public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to freeriding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that subjects are at least as cooperative when uninformed about others' behaviour as they are if reacting to high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous play is found to be more efficient than sequential play, and subjects contribute less at the end of a sequence than at the start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.

Between the lines: Konrad Wolf's 'Mama, ich lebe' and the dilemmas of betrayal

The article offers a close reading of Konrad Wolf’s anti-fascist Second World War film 'Mama, ich lebe' (DEFA, 1977). 'Mama, ich lebe', like all East German films about the Nazi past, deals with the re-founding of post-war Germany. Unlike the usual approach which focused on political redemption of the past crimes, Wolf’s approach explores rupture and failure of political agency as the pre-condition for a new beginning. The rupture is effected by the defection of four Wehrmacht soldiers who decide to cooperate with the Soviet enemy. Their betrayal of the national collective is ethically motivated and arises from their responsibility for the Soviet ‘other’. Its radicalness opens up a moment of utopian freedom and conciliation for the traitors. Yet the back side of betrayal is insecurity and confliction with regard to their role and roots. While the four meet their role as traitors with self-deception about their ambivalent position, they are eventually forced to acknowledge their position as one of self-defeat. Their ‘ethical betrayal’ (Parikh 2009) does therefore not lead to utopian fulfilment but to the traitors’ expiatory sacrifice as the only form of accountability and self-justification. In Wolf’s film antifascism as a tale of political redemption is thus revised and becomes a tale of necessary individual atonement.

Fairness quality: the role of fairness in a social and ethically oriented marketing landscape

Research into the dark side of customer management and marketing is progressively growing. The marketing landscape today is dominated with suspicion and distrust as a result of practices that include hidden fees, deception and information mishandling. In such a pessimistic economy, marketers must reconceptualise the notion of fairness in marketing and customer management, so that the progress of sophisticated customisation schemes and advancements in marketing can flourish, avoiding further control and imposed regulation. In this article, emerging research is drawn to suggest that existing quality measures of marketing activities, including service, relationships and experiences may not be comprehensive in measuring the relevant things in the social and ethically oriented marketing landscape, and on that basis does not measure the fairness which truly is important in such an economy. The paper puts forward the concept of Fairness Quality (FAIRQUAL), which includes as well as extends on existing thinking behind relationship building, experience creation and other types of customer management practices that are believed to predict consumer intentions. It is proposed that a fairness quality measure will aid marketers in this challenging landscape and economy.

Whatever it takes: rivalry and unethical behavior

This research investigates the link between rivalry and unethical behavior. We propose that people will engage in greater unethical behavior when competing against their rivals than when competing against non-rival competitors. Across a series of experiments and an archival study, we find that rivalry is associated with increased use of deception, unsportsmanlike behavior, willingness to employ unethical negotiation tactics, and misreporting of performance. We also explore the psychological underpinnings of rivalry, which help to illuminate how it differs from general competition, and why it increases unethical behavior. Rivalry as compared to non-rival competition was associated with increased status concerns, contingency of self-worth, and performance goals; mediation analyses revealed that performance goals played the biggest role in explaining why rivalry promoted greater unethicality. Lastly, we find that merely thinking about a rival can be enough to promote greater unethical behavior, even in domains unrelated to the rivalry. These findings highlight the importance of rivalry as a widespread, powerful, yet largely unstudied phenomenon with significant organizational implications. Further, the results help to inform when and why unethical behavior occurs within organizations, and demonstrate that the effects of competition are dependent upon relationships and prior interactions.