3 resultados para Deceit

em CentAUR: Central Archive University of Reading - UK


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Floral nectar spurs are widely considered to influence pollinator behaviour in orchids. Spurs of 21 orchid species selected from within four molecularly circumscribed clades of subtribe Orchidinae (based on Platanthera s.l., Gymnadenia-Dactylorhiza s.l., Anacamptis s.l., Orchis s.s.) were examined under light and scanning electron microscopes in order to estimate correlations between nectar production (categorized as absent, trace, reservoir), interior epidermal papillae (categorized as absent, short, medium, long) and epidermal cell striations (categorized as apparently absent, weak, moderate, strong). Closely related congeneric species scored similarly, but more divergent species showed less evidence of phylogenetic constraints. Nectar secretion was negatively correlated with striations and positively correlated with papillae, which were especially frequent and large in species producing substantial reservoirs of nectar. We speculate that the primary function of the papillae is conserving energy through nectar resorption and explain the presence of large papillae in a minority of deceit-pollinated species by arguing that the papillae improve pollination because they are a tactile expectation of pollinating insects. In contrast, the prominence of striations may be a 'spandrel', simply reflecting the thickness of the overlying cuticle. Developmentally, the spur is an invagination of the labellum; it is primarily vascularized by a single 'U'-shaped primary strand, with smaller strands present in some species. Several suggestions are made for developing further, more targeted research programmes. (C) 2009 The Linnean Society of London, Botanical Journal of the Linnean Society, 2009, 160, 369-387.

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Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making “others' behaviour” a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard device, the Random Lottery incentive system. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. The design is implemented in a sequential play public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to freeriding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that subjects are at least as cooperative when uninformed about others' behaviour as they are if reacting to high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous play is found to be more efficient than sequential play, and subjects contribute less at the end of a sequence than at the start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.

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Modern transaction cost economics (TCE) thinking has developed into a key intellectual foundation of international business (IB) research, but the Williamsonian version has faced substantial criticism for adopting the behavioral assumption of opportunism. In this paper we assess both the opportunism concept and existing alternatives such as trust within the context of IB research, especially work on multinational enterprise (MNE) governance. Case analyses of nine global MNEs illustrate an alternative to the opportunism assumption that captures more fully the mechanisms underlying failed commitments inside the MNE. As a substitute for the often-criticized assumption of opportunism, we propose the envelope concept of bounded reliability (BRel), an assumption that represents more accurately and more completely the reasons for failed commitments, without invalidating the other critical assumption in conventional TCE (and internalization theory) thinking, namely the widely accepted envelope concept of bounded rationality (BRat). Bounded reliability as an envelope concept includes two main components, within the context of global MNE management: opportunism as intentional deceit, and benevolent preference reversal. The implications for IB research of adopting the bounded reliability concept are far reaching, as this concept may increase the legitimacy of comparative institutional analysis in the social sciences.