Echoes of 1992: the NAFTA negotiations and North America now

Two decades ago, Canada, Mexico, and the United States created a continental economy. The road to integration from the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement has not been a smooth one. Along the way, Mexico lived through a currency crisis, a democratic transition, and the rising challenge of Asian manufacturing. Canada stayed united despite surging Quebecois nationalism during the 1990s; since then, it has seen dramatic economic changes with the explosion of hydrocarbon production and a much stronger currency. The United States saw a stock-market bust, the shock of 9/11, and the near-collapse of its financial system. All of these events have transformed the relationships that emerged after NAFTA entered into force in 1994. Given the tremendous changes, one might be skeptical that the circumstances and details of the negotiation and ratification of NAFTA hold lessons for the future of North America. However, the road to NAFTA had its own difficulties, and many of the issues involved in the negotiations underpin today's challenges. NAFTA was conceived at a time of profound change in the international system. When Mexican leaders surveyed the world two decades ago, they saw emerging regional groupings in Europe, Asia, and South America. Faced with a lack of interest or compatibility, they instead doubled down on North America. How did Mexican leaders reconsider their national interests and redefine Mexico's role in the world in light of those transformations? Unpublished Mexican documents from SECOFI, the secretariate most involved in negotiating NAFTA, help illustrate Mexican thinking about its interests and role at that time. Combining those insights with analysis of newly available evidence from U.S. presidential archives, this paper sheds light on the negotiations that concluded two decades ago.

Post-neoliberal electricity market ‘re-reforms’ in Argentina: Diverging from market prescriptions?

This paper focuses upon the policy and institutional change that has taken place within the Argentine electricity market since the country’s economic and social crisis of 2001/2. As one of the first less developed countries (LDCs) to liberalise and privatise its electricity industry, Argentina has since moved away from the orthodox market model after consumer prices were frozen by the Government in early 2002 when the national currency was devalued by 70%. Although its reforms were widely praised during the 1990s, the electricity market has undergone a number of interventions, ostensibly to keep consumer prices low and to avert the much-discussed energy ‘crisis’ caused by a dearth of new investment combined with rising demand levels. This paper explores how the economic crisis and its consequences have both enabled and legitimised these policy and institutional amendments, while drawing upon the specifics of the post-neoliberal market ‘re-reforms’ to consider the extent to which the Government appears to be moving away from market-based prescriptions. In addition, this paper contributes to sector-specific understandings of how, despite these changes, neoliberal ideas and assumptions continue to dominate Argentine public policy well beyond the postcrisis era.

Reactive crisis management in construction projects

Patterns of communication and behaviour emerge within a construction project in response to a construction crisis. This paper investigates, within a grounded theory framework, the nature of these patterns, the sociological and psychological forces which shape them and their relationship with crisis management efficiency. A grounded theory is presented in four parts. The first part conceives a construction crisis as a period of social instability, arising from conflicting interest groups, seeking to exercise power in the pursuit of social structures which suit their political and economic interests. The second part sees a construction crisis as a de-sensitizing phenomenon which results in a period of behavioural instability and conflict which is self-perpetuating. The third part cites social structure as an important influence upon construction crisis management efficiency, in determining the efficiency of information flow, and the level of uncertainty between those affected. The fourth part points to the in-built defence mechanisms which construction crises have and to three managerial ironies which make construction crisis management difficult.