An inspector's-eye view - The prospective enforcement of work-related fatality cases

This paper concerns the prospective implementation of the proposed 'corporate killing' offence. These proposals suggested that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)-the body currently responsible for regulating work-related health and safety issues-should handle cases in which a 'corporate killing' charge is a possibility. Relatively little attention has been paid to this issue of implementation. An empirical investigation was undertaken to assess the compatibility of the HSE's methodology and enforcement philosophy with the new offence. It was found that inspectors categorize themselves as enforcers of criminal law, see enforcement action as valuable and support the new offence, but disagree over its use. They also broadly supported the HSE taking responsibility for the new offence. This suggests that 'corporate killing' may not necessarily be incompatible with the HSE's modus operandi, and there may be positive reasons forgiving the HSE this responsibility.

Mediating punitiveness: understanding public attitudes towards work-related fatality cases

This paper concerns an empirical investigation into public attitudes towards work-related fatality cases, where organizational offenders cause the death of workers or members of the public. This issue is particularly relevant following the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 into UK law. Here, as elsewhere, the use of criminal law against companies reflects governmental concerns over public confidence in the law’s ability to regulate risk. The empirical findings demonstrate that high levels of public concern over these cases do not translate into punitive attitudes. Such cases are viewed rationally and constructively, and lead to instrumental rather than purely expressive enforcement preferences.

Understanding the seriousness of corporate crime: Some lessons for the new 'corporate manslaughter' offence

The measurement of public attitudes towards the criminal law has become an important area of research in recent years because of the perceived desirability of ensuring that the legal system reflects broader societal values. In particular, studies into public perceptions of crime seriousness have attempted to measure the degree of concordance that exists between law and public opinion in the organization and enforcement of criminal offences. These understandings of perceived crime seriousness are particularly important in relation to high-profile issues where public confidence in the law is central to the legal agenda, such as the enforcement of work-related fatality cases. A need to respond to public concern over this issue was cited as a primary justification for the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. This article will suggest that, although literature looking at the perceived seriousness of corporate crime and, particularly, health and safety offences is limited in volume and generalist in scope, important lessons can be gleaned from existing literature, and pressing questions are raised that demand further empirical investigation.

Redefining the outer boundaries of EU Law: the Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci trilogy

In its three recent rulings in the cases of Zambrano, McCarthy, and Dereci, the Court appears to have been determined to redefine the external boundaries of EU law, in cases involving the family reunification rights of Union citizens.These three judgments can be read as an indication that for Article 20 TFEU to apply, there is no longer a requirement of a cross-border element on the facts of the case, and that it is sufficient if the contested national measure has the effect of ‘depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of their rights (the ‘Zambrano principle’).The cases can, at the same time, also be read as a confirmation that the free movement provisions do – still – require a cross-border element and, in particular, the exercise of inter-State movement, in order to apply. Though the result in these cases has not been entirely unexpected, especially in the aftermath of the Rottmann ruling, it is rather problematic in that, although it is obvious that the Court wishes to redraw the line dividing the national and EU spheres of competence, it does not make it entirely clear where this line now lies and leaves many essential questions unanswered, which will obviously require some time to be resolved. EU lawyers are consequently, once more, left with having to decipher as best as they can the real intentions of the Court in this new line of case-law, which has been further complicated by the fact that what the Court seems to have given with one hand in Zambrano (and before that in Rottmann), has taken it back to a large extent through its rulings in McCarthy and Dereci, which appear to confine the former two cases to their own exceptional facts.6 Moreover, the ‘reverse discrimination Pandora’s box’, the opening of which appears to have been the real target of these references, remains untouched: instead of providing a direct solution to this problem, the Court has chosen to – once again – broaden the scope of the Treaty provisions in order to include within it as many situations as possible and, thus, prevent the emergence of this type of differential treatment on a case-by-case basis.As will be explained, nonetheless, this is by no means an appropriate solution to the reverse discrimination conundrum.

Truth commissions: a barrier to the provision of judicial assistance?

Truth commissions and criminal trials have come to be perceived as complementary transitional justice mechanisms. However, where effective prosecutions are dependent on the exchange of information and transfer of suspects between states under existing mutual legal assistance and extradition arrangements, the operation of a truth commission in the state of territoriality may act as an obstacle to international cooperation. At the same time, requests for assistance from a third state pursuing prosecutions may impact negatively on the truth commission process in the requested state by inhibiting those reluctant to become involved in criminal proceedings from offering testimony. This article demonstrates a practical discord between these bodies when they operate in different states and questions whether they can truly be considered “complementary”.

Could the presumption of innocence protect the guilty?

At criminal trial, we demand that those accused of criminal wrongdoing be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. What are the moral and/or political grounds of this demand? One popular and natural answer to this question focuses on the moral badness or wrongness of convicting and punishing innocent persons, which I call the direct moral grounding. In this essay, I suggest that this direct moral grounding, if accepted, may well have important ramifications for other areas of the criminal justice process, and in particular those parts in which we (through our legislatures and judges) decide how much punishment to distribute to guilty persons. If, as the direct moral grounding suggests, we should prefer under-punishment to over-punishment under conditions of uncertainty, due to the moral seriousness of errors which inappropriately punish persons, then we should also prefer erring on the side of under-punishment when considering how much to punish those who may justly be punished. Some objections to this line of thinking are considered.

Retributivists! The harm principle is not for you!

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, whilst retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. For some versions of the harm principle, this is because retributivism is logically incompatible with it, or its grounds. For others, retributivists can only endorse the harm principle at the cost of endorsing implausible positions about the content of the criminal law.

Attacking human implants: a new generation of cybercrime

Human ICT implants, such as RFID implants, cochlear implants, cardiac pacemakers, Deep Brain Stimulation, bionic limbs connected to the nervous system, and networked cognitive prostheses, are becoming increasingly complex. With ever-growing data processing functionalities in these implants, privacy and security become vital concerns. Electronic attacks on human ICT implants can cause significant harm, both to implant subjects and to their environment. This paper explores the vulnerabilities which human implants pose to crime victimisation in light of recent technological developments, and analyses how the law can deal with emerging challenges of what may well become the next generation of cybercrime: attacks targeted at technology implanted in the human body. After a state-of-the-art description of relevant types of human implants and a discussion how these implants challenge existing perceptions of the human body, we describe how various modes of attacks, such as sniffing, hacking, data interference, and denial of service, can be committed against implants. Subsequently, we analyse how these attacks can be assessed under current substantive and procedural criminal law, drawing on examples from UK and Dutch law. The possibilities and limitations of cybercrime provisions (eg, unlawful access, system interference) and bodily integrity provisions (eg, battery, assault, causing bodily harm) to deal with human-implant attacks are analysed. Based on this assessment, the paper concludes that attacks on human implants are not only a new generation in the evolution of cybercrime, but also raise fundamental questions on how criminal law conceives of attacks. Traditional distinctions between physical and non-physical modes of attack, between human bodies and things, between exterior and interior of the body need to be re-interpreted in light of developments in human implants. As the human body and technology become increasingly intertwined, cybercrime legislation and body-integrity crime legislation will also become intertwined, posing a new puzzle that legislators and practitioners will sooner or later have to solve.