In search of the aim of the free movement of persons provisions: has the Court of Justice missed the point?

The Court of Justice has, over the years, often been vilified for exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction by interpreting the provisions of Community legislation in a way not seem originally envisaged by its drafters. A recent example of this approach was a cluster of cases in the context of the free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment (Ritter-Coulais and its progeny), where the Court included within the scope of those provisions situations which, arguably, did not present a sufficient link with their (economic) aim. In particular, in that case law the Court accepted that the mere exercise of free movement for the purpose of taking up residence in the territory of another Member State whilst continuing to exercise an economic activity in the State of origin, suffices for bringing a Member State national within the scope of Articles 39 and 43 EC. It is argued that the most plausible explanation for this approach is that the Court now wishes to re-read the economic fundamental freedoms in such a way as to include within their scope all economically active Union citizens, irrespective of whether their situation presents a sufficient link with the exercise of an economic activity in a cross-border context. It is suggested that this approach is problematic for a number of reasons. It is, therefore, concluded that the Court should revert to its orthodox approach, according to which only situations that involve Union citizens who have moved between Member States for the purpose of taking up an economic activity should be included within the scope of the market freedoms.

The unpatriotism of the economic constitution? Rights to free movement and their impact on national and European identity

Abstract: Instead of the political reading of the EU Constitution adopted by advocates of constitutional patriotism, this article examines the European economic constitution. The four single market freedoms can be used by the Court of Justice to strike down Member State laws which represent deeply held aspects of national cultural identity. The article examines whether the court does in fact act in this way and proceeds to argue that the issue of identity protection does not stop with the court. In those policy areas where the court is more interventionist, and its case-law is perceived as an identity threat, one is likely to find binding Treaty-based derogations. Where, in contrast, the effect of the court's case-law poses less of a threat, one is more likely to see non-binding declarations. The article examines a number of policy areas in which specific cultural derogations and declarations are to be found, including abortion, property acquisition, football and alcohol control.

Internal doubts about Cohen's Rescue of Justice

G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible.