Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: assessing the state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption

This paper charts the current evidence on effectiveness of different anti-corruption reforms, and identifies significant evidence gaps. Despite a substantial amount of literature on corruption, this review found very few studies focusing on anti-corruption reforms, and even fewer that credibly assess issues of effectiveness and impact. The evidence was strong for only two types of interventions: public financial management (PFM) reforms and supreme audit institutions (SAIs). For PFM, the evidence in general showed positive results, whereas the effectiveness was mixed for SAIs. No strong evidence indicates that any of the interventions pursued have been ineffective, but there is fair evidence that anti-corruption authorities, civil service reforms and the use of corruption conditionality in aid allocation decisions in general have not been effective. The paper advocates more operationally-relevant research and rigorous evaluations to build up the missing evidence base, particularly in conflict-afflicted states, in regards to the private sector, and on the interactions and interdependencies between different anti-corruption interventions.

Corruption and state-building

The chapter examines the compex roles of corruption in state-buioding environments. The first section briefly outlines how statebuilding is conceptualized in this discussion. The second section examines the concept of corruption,and argues that the organization, rather than the scale of corruption, offers a better lens through which its impact can be analyzed. The third section examines the complex relationship between corruption and statebuilding through the lenses of two key aspects of statebuilding – elite settlements, and the provision of public services – and briefly discusses both the complex relationship between corruption and security, and the impact of aid on corruption in statebuilding environments. The fourth section concludes the chapter with a reflection on the implications of the analysis for understanding contemporary statebuilding efforts and policy.

Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially towards the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

Uptake of agri-environmental schemes in the Less-Favoured Areas of Greece: The role of corruption and farmers' responses to the financial crisis

Vine-growing in the Less-Favoured Areas of Greece is facing multiple challenges that might lead to its abandonment. In an attempt to maintain rural populations, Rural Development Schemes have been created that offer the opportunity to rural households to maintain or expand their farming businesses including vine-growing. This paper stems from a study that used data from a cross-sectional survey of 204 farmers to investigate how farming systems and farmers’ perception of corruption, amongst other socio-economic factors, affected their decisions to continue vine-growing through participation in Rural Development Schemes, in three remote Less-Favoured Areas of Greece. The Theory of Planned Behaviour was used to frame the research problem with the assumption being that an individual’s intention to participate in a Scheme is based on their prior beliefs about it. Data from the survey were reduced and simplified by the use of non-linear principal component analysis. The ensuing variables were used in selectivity corrected ordered probit models to reveal farmers’ attitudes towards viticulture and rural development. It was found that economic factors, perceived corruption and farmers’ attitudes were significant determinants on whether to participate in the Schemes. The research findings highlight the important role of perceived corruption and the need for policies that facilitate farmers’ access to decision making centres.

Parliamentarians and corruption in Africa: the challenge of leadership and the practice of politics

This report, compiled on behalf of the African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption (APNAC), surveys the attitudes of African parliamentarians toward corruption. It is the first study of its kind to investigate the manner in which corruption impacts directly upon the political behaviour, practices and attitudes of those elected members sitting in parliaments across the continent. If the problems of corruption are to be tackled in the African continent, then the role of elected members of legislative assemblies will surely be a crucial factor.