The automatic identification and prioritisation of criminal networks from police crime data

The identification of criminal networks is not a routine exploratory process within the current practice of the law enforcement authorities; rather it is triggered by specific evidence of criminal activity being investigated. A network is identified when a criminal comes to notice and any associates who could also be potentially implicated would need to be identified if only to be eliminated from the enquiries as suspects or witnesses as well as to prevent and/or detect crime. However, an identified network may not be the one causing most harm in a given area.. This paper identifies a methodology to identify all of the criminal networks that are present within a Law Enforcement Area, and, prioritises those that are causing most harm to the community. Each crime is allocated a score based on its crime type and how recently the crime was committed; the network score, which can be used as decision support to help prioritise it for law enforcement purposes, is the sum of the individual crime scores.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

Grey waters bright with Neolithic argonauts? Maritime connections and the Mesolithic-Neolithic transition within the 'western seaways' of Britain, c. 5000-3500 BC.

Careful examination of the probable natural conditions for travel in the North Sea and Irish Sea during the late Mesolithic are here combined with the latest radiocarbon dates to present a new picture of the transition to the Neolithic in the British Isles. The islands of the west were already connected by Mesolithic traffic and did not all go Neolithic at the same time. The introduction of the Neolithic package neither depended on seaborne incomers nor on proximity to the continent. More interesting forces were probably operating on an already busy seaway.

Are informed citizens more trusting? Transparency of performance data and trust towards a British police force

In Britain, substantial cuts in police budgets alongside controversial handling of incidents such as politically sensitive enquiries, public disorder and relations with the media have recently triggered much debate about public knowledge and trust in the police. To date, however, little academic research has investigated how knowledge of police performance impacts citizens’ trust. We address this long-standing lacuna by exploring citizens’ trust before and after exposure to real performance data in the context of a British police force. The results reveal that being informed of performance data affects citizens’ trust significantly. Furthermore, direction and degree of change in trust are related to variations across the different elements of the reported performance criteria. Interestingly, the volatility of citizens’ trust is related to initial performance perceptions (such that citizens with low initial perceptions of police performance react more significantly to evidence of both good and bad performance than citizens with high initial perceptions), and citizens’ intentions to support the police do not always correlate with their cognitive and affective trust towards the police. In discussing our findings, we explore the implications of how being transparent with performance data can both hinder and be helpful in developing citizens’ trust towards a public organisation such as the police. From our study, we pose a number of ethical challenges that practitioners face when deciding what data to highlight, to whom, and for what purpose.

Looking in the wrong place for healthcare improvements: a system dynamics study of an accident and emergency department

Accident and Emergency (A&E) units provide a route for patients requiring urgent admission to acute hospitals. Public concern over long waiting times for admissions motivated this study, whose aim is to explore the factors which contribute to such delays. The paper discusses the formulation and calibration of a system dynamics model of the interaction of demand pattern, A&E resource deployment, other hospital processes and bed numbers; and the outputs of policy analysis runs of the model which vary a number of the key parameters. Two significant findings have policy implications. One is that while some delays to patients are unavoidable, reductions can be achieved by selective augmentation of resources within, and relating to, the A&E unit. The second is that reductions in bed numbers do not increase waiting times for emergency admissions, their effect instead being to increase sharply the number of cancellations of admissions for elective surgery. This suggests that basing A&E policy solely on any single criterion will merely succeed in transferring the effects of a resource deficit to a different patient group.

Collective financing among Chinese entrepreneurs and department store retailing in China

Chinese entrepreneurship in department store retailing differed from that seen in other emerging economies before 1940. Rather than the leading examples of the format being owned by advanced economy firms, in China a small group of Cantonese entrepreneurs established what became known as the ‘Big Four’ department stores in Shanghai. By 1940 the ‘Big Four’ department stores were among the most famous stores in China, and among the biggest businesses in China. None of these Chinese entrepreneurs had any prior experience in department store retailing. Rather this article explains how their success in department store retailing was dependent on a business model that enabled these Chinese entrepreneurs to act as informal investment bankers (or ‘shadow’ banks) for the thousands of overseas Chinese wanting to invest surplus savings in mainland China, so creating large indigenous business groups.