A multinomial model of applying recognition to judge between multiple alternatives

Proponents of the “fast and frugal” approach to decision-making suggest that inferential judgments are best made on the basis of limited information. For example, if only one of two cities is recognized and the task is to judge which city has the larger population, the recognition heuristic states that the recognized city should be selected. In preference choices with >2 options, it is also standard to assume that a “consideration set”, based upon some simple criterion, is established to reduce the options available. A multinomial processing tree model is outlined which provides the basis for estimating the extent to which recognition is used as a criterion in establishing a consideration set for inferential judgments.

Inferring the biggest and best: a measurement model for applying recognition to evoke consideration sets and judge between multiple alternatives

It has long been supposed that preference judgments between sets of to-be-considered possibilities are made by means of initially winnowing down the most promising-looking alternatives to form smaller “consideration sets” (Howard, 1963; Wright & Barbour, 1977). In preference choices with >2 options, it is standard to assume that a “consideration set”, based upon some simple criterion, is established to reduce the options available. Inferential judgments, in contrast, have more frequently been investigated in situations in which only two possibilities need to be considered (e.g., which of these two cities is the larger?) Proponents of the “fast and frugal” approach to decision-making suggest that such judgments are also made on the basis of limited, simple criteria. For example, if only one of two cities is recognized and the task is to judge which city has the larger population, the recognition heuristic states that the recognized city should be selected. A multinomial processing tree model is outlined which provides the basis for estimating the extent to which recognition is used as a criterion in establishing a consideration set for inferential judgments between three possible options.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

After the referendum: options for a constitutional convention

Whatever the result of Scotland’s independence referendum, careful constitutional thinking will be needed. If Scots vote Yes, Scotland will need a new constitution and the rest of the UK will have to rethink its governing structures. Even in the event of a No vote, everyone agrees that the shape of the Union will need to change over the coming years. This paper examines how such constitution-making should take place. It sets out the options, gathers evidence from around the world on how those options might work, and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. It concludes that constitutional proposals in the UK should best be developed by a convention comprising a mixture of ordinary members of the public and politicians; these proposals should be put to a referendum. This approach, the paper argues, offers the best route to high-quality debate, stronger democratic engagement, and, ultimately, deeper legitimacy for our governing structures.