Financial protection in the UK building industry: bonds, retentions and guarantees

Financial Protection in the UK Building Industry provides comprehensive treatment of a complex aspect of construction management which is increasingly important in modern construction contracts. The term 'Financial Protection' refers to refers to the various mechanisms by which funds are made available to ensure the due performance of a partys contractual obligations. This book is based on material written for a research project funded by the Reading Construction Forum. Financial Protection in the UK Building Industry looks at the legal and economic background to the problem of providing financial protection to clients to guard against poor performance and or the insolvency of contractors, consultants and sub-contractors. The inclusion of practical guidance notes and summaries makes this a valuable guide for the construction professional as well as for the researcher. * provides in-depth analysis of financial protection measures * explores the ways in which financial protection can increase efficiency in the industry * financial protection in construction is beset with problems - this book points toward practical solutions

Experimental duopolies under price guarantees

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type.

Pro-competitive price beating guarantees: experimental evidence

We report experimental results on duopoly pricing with and without price beating guarantees (PBG). In two control treatments, price beating is either imposed as an industry-wide rule or offered as a business strategy. Our major finding is that when price beating guarantees are imposed as a rule or offered as an option, effective prices are equal to or lower than those in a baseline treatment in which price beating is forbidden. Also, when price beating is treated as a business strategy, less than 50% of subjects adopted the guarantee, suggesting that, subjects realize the pro-competitive effects of the guarantee.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

After the referendum: options for a constitutional convention

Whatever the result of Scotland’s independence referendum, careful constitutional thinking will be needed. If Scots vote Yes, Scotland will need a new constitution and the rest of the UK will have to rethink its governing structures. Even in the event of a No vote, everyone agrees that the shape of the Union will need to change over the coming years. This paper examines how such constitution-making should take place. It sets out the options, gathers evidence from around the world on how those options might work, and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. It concludes that constitutional proposals in the UK should best be developed by a convention comprising a mixture of ordinary members of the public and politicians; these proposals should be put to a referendum. This approach, the paper argues, offers the best route to high-quality debate, stronger democratic engagement, and, ultimately, deeper legitimacy for our governing structures.