After the referendum: options for a constitutional convention

Whatever the result of Scotland’s independence referendum, careful constitutional thinking will be needed. If Scots vote Yes, Scotland will need a new constitution and the rest of the UK will have to rethink its governing structures. Even in the event of a No vote, everyone agrees that the shape of the Union will need to change over the coming years. This paper examines how such constitution-making should take place. It sets out the options, gathers evidence from around the world on how those options might work, and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. It concludes that constitutional proposals in the UK should best be developed by a convention comprising a mixture of ordinary members of the public and politicians; these proposals should be put to a referendum. This approach, the paper argues, offers the best route to high-quality debate, stronger democratic engagement, and, ultimately, deeper legitimacy for our governing structures.

Protecting recognized Geneva Convention refugees outside their states of asylum

This article highlights the predicament of persons recognized as refugees according to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CSR1951 refugees) when they travel outside their state of asylum. Their status entails ipso facto that, if they are ill-treated abroad, they cannot turn to representatives of their state of nationality and request its diplomatic protection, nor can they expect to receive its consular assistance. It is submitted that a state of asylum ought to extend the scope of protection that it offers CSR1951 refugees residing in its territory, and provide them diplomatic protection and consular assistance when they travel abroad as if they were its nationals. Four claims are advanced in support of this contention: First: the advent of human rights treaties has not rendered obsolete the protection of nationals abroad nor has the practice fallen into disuse. On the contrary, protection abroad retains its pedigree and significance, as is illustrated by the recently adopted International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection and by frequent resort to consular assistance. Second: while states previously enjoyed unfettered discretion concerning whether and when to protect their nationals abroad, recent developments in domestic jurisdictions as well as in European Union (EU) treaties point to the potential emergence of a qualified duty to exercise state protection or to be willing to provide justifications for its refusal. These developments call particular attention to the vulnerability of CSR1951 refugees: the professed aim of the EU treaty regime is that EU citizens should enjoy effective state protection wherever they travel; by contrast, CSR1951 refugees are in need of state protection wherever they travel. Third: according to CSR1951, states of asylum are required to issue Convention Travel Documents (CTDs) to recognized refugees lawfully staying in their territory. While CTDs do not in of themselves authorize states of asylum to provide protection abroad to their CSR1951 refugees, they reflect partial recognition of the instrumental role of these states in facilitating safe refugee travel. Fourth: while the 'nationality of claims' requirement remains pivotal to the institution of diplomatic protection, and efforts to effectuate its general relaxation have thus far failed, the International Law Commission (ILC) has 'carved out' an exception authorizing states of asylum to provide protection abroad to their recognized refugees. The ILC's protection-enhancing agenda, reflecting progressive development of the law, is laudable, even though it has opted for a rather cautious approach.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.