Changing direction on direction of fit

In this paper, I show that we should understand the direction of fit of beliefs and desires in normative terms. After rehearsing a standard objection to Michael Smith’s analysis of direction of fit, I raise a similar problem for Lloyd Humberstone’s analysis. I go on to offer my own account, according to which the difference between beliefs and desires is determined by the normative relations such states stand in. I argue that beliefs are states which we have reason to change in light of the world, whereas desires are states that give us reason to change the world. After doing this, I show how the view avoids various objections, including two from David Sobel and David Copp. The paper ends by briefly discussing the relevance of the view to the Humean theory of motivation.

Comments on 'Balance and the slow quasimanifold: some explicit results'

The concept of slow vortical dynamics and its role in theoretical understanding is central to geophysical fluid dynamics. It leads, for example, to “potential vorticity thinking” (Hoskins et al. 1985). Mathematically, one imagines an invariant manifold within the phase space of solutions, called the slow manifold (Leith 1980; Lorenz 1980), to which the dynamics are constrained. Whether this slow manifold truly exists has been a major subject of inquiry over the past 20 years. It has become clear that an exact slow manifold is an exceptional case, restricted to steady or perhaps temporally periodic flows (Warn 1997). Thus the concept of a “fuzzy slow manifold” (Warn and Ménard 1986) has been suggested. The idea is that nearly slow dynamics will occur in a stochastic layer about the putative slow manifold. The natural question then is, how thick is this layer? In a recent paper, Ford et al. (2000) argue that Lighthill emission—the spontaneous emission of freely propagating acoustic waves by unsteady vortical flows—is applicable to the problem of balance, with the Mach number Ma replaced by the Froude number F, and that it is a fundamental mechanism for this fuzziness. They consider the rotating shallow-water equations and find emission of inertia–gravity waves at O(F2). This is rather surprising at first sight, because several studies of balanced dynamics with the rotating shallow-water equations have gone beyond second order in F, and found only an exponentially small unbalanced component (Warn and Ménard 1986; Lorenz and Krishnamurthy 1987; Bokhove and Shepherd 1996; Wirosoetisno and Shepherd 2000). We have no technical objection to the analysis of Ford et al. (2000), but wish to point out that it depends crucially on R 1, where R is the Rossby number. This condition requires the ratio of the characteristic length scale of the flow L to the Rossby deformation radius LR to go to zero in the limit F → 0. This is the low Froude number scaling of Charney (1963), which, while originally designed for the Tropics, has been argued to be also relevant to mesoscale dynamics (Riley et al. 1981). If L/LR is fixed, however, then F → 0 implies R → 0, which is the standard quasigeostrophic scaling of Charney (1948; see, e.g., Pedlosky 1987). In this limit there is reason to expect the fuzziness of the slow manifold to be “exponentially thin,” and balance to be much more accurate than is consistent with (algebraic) Lighthill emission.

Hypothetical choice, egalitarianism, and the separateness of persons

Luck egalitarians claim that disadvantage is worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk than when it emerges from a chosen risk. I argue that disadvantage is also worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would have declined to take, had he or she been able to do so, than when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would not have declined to take. Such a view is significant because it allows both luck egalitarians and prioritarians to respond to Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey's charge that they fail to accommodate intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries – the so-called separateness of persons objection. I argue that the view is plausible independently of its ability to answer the separateness of persons objection, and is a natural extension of the luck egalitarian concern with the impact of unchosen circumstance.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.

Do personality traits predict ‘complaining’ consumers?

Although the effects of personality traits on complaining behaviour emerged in the early 1980s, there is limited research in the service industry. The purpose of this study is to examine whether consumer personality traits influence intentions to complain and whether product price and product types moderate the relationship between personality traits and intentions to complain in the retail industry. The research model is tested by logistic regression analysis on two groups of consumers who report passive and active complaining intentions. The study reveals that conscientious consumers who are open to new experiences tend to have higher intentions to complain. Being extroverted does not have any influence on complaining behaviour. Whilst price levels (low/high) and product types (grocery, clothing and electronics) improve the predictive ability of the complaining behaviour, the interaction effects relating to the three personality traits are statistically insignificant. Theoretical and managerial implications of the study findings are discussed.