Health and safety on construction sites in Ghana

The state of health and safety on construction sites in Ghana was investigated using first hand observation of fourteen (14) construction project sites in 2009 and 2010. At each site, the construction project, workers and the physical environment of the site were inspected and evaluated against health and safety indicators taken from the literature. The results reveal a poor state of health and safety on Ghanaian construction sites. The primary reasons are a lack of strong institutional framework for governing construction activities and poor enforcement of health and safety policies and procedures. Also, Ghanaian society does not place a high premium on health and safety of construction workers on site. Interviews with workers indicated that injuries and accidents are common on sites. However, compensation for injury is often at the discretion of the contractor although collective bargaining agreements between Labour unions and employers prescribe obligations for the contractor in the event of injury to a worker.

Institutions, unionization and voice: the relative impact of context and actors on firm level practice

Trade unions provide a voice in the way firms are run, an input into reward systems and increased security of employment. But these vary with national context. Using transnational survey evidence, this article explores the relative impact of setting, and of unions and collective bargaining, on these issues. It is found that, irrespective of context, organizations are significantly more likely to make use of compulsory redundancies in the absence of unions and collective bargaining. However, in other areas, the impact of unions appeared less pronounced than that of the wider context. The article explores the reasons behind this, and the broader policy implications thereof.

An exploration of the drivers to bio-security collective action among a sample of UK cattle and sheep farmers

At present, collective action regarding bio-security among UK cattle and sheep farmers is rare. Despite the occurrence of catastrophic livestock diseases such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and foot and mouth disease (FMD), within recent decades, there are few national or local farmer-led animal health schemes. To explore the reasons for this apparent lack of interest, we utilised a socio-psychological approach to disaggregate the cognitive, emotive and contextual factors driving bio-security behaviour among cattle and sheep farmers in the United Kingdom (UK). In total, we interviewed 121 farmers in South-West England and Wales. The main analytical tools included a content, cluster and logistic regression analysis. The results of the content analysis illustrated apparent 'dissonance' between bio-security attitudes and behaviour.(1) Despite the heavy toll animal disease has taken on the agricultural economy, most study participants were dismissive of the many measures associated with bio-security. Justification for this lack of interest was largely framed in relation to the collective attribution or blame for the disease threats themselves. Indeed, epidemic diseases were largely related to external actors and agents. Reasons for outbreaks included inadequate border control, in tandem with ineffective policies and regulations. Conversely, endemic livestock disease was viewed as a problem for 'bad' farmers and not an issue for those individuals who managed their stock well. As such, there was little utility in forming groups to address what was largely perceived as an individual problem. Further, we found that attitudes toward bio-security did not appear to be influenced by any particular source of information per se. While strong negative attitudes were found toward specific sources of bio-security information, e.g. government leaflets, these appear to simply reflect widely held beliefs. In relation to actual bio-security behaviours, the logistic regression analysis revealed no significant difference between in-scheme and out of scheme farmers. We concluded that in order to support collective action with regard to bio-security, messages need to be reframed and delivered from a neutral source. Efforts to support group formation must also recognise and address the issues relating to perceptions of social connectedness among the communities involved. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract

This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.

Effect of priming cooperation or individualism on a collective and interdependent task: changeover speed in the 4 x 100-meter relay race

Priming effects of cooperation vs. individualism were investigated on changeover speed within a 4 x 100-m relay race. Ten teams of four adult beginner athletes ran two relays, a pretest race and an experimental race 3 weeks later. Just before the experimental race, athletes were primed with either cooperation or individualism through a scrambled-sentence task. Comparing to the pretest performance, cooperation priming improved baton speed in the exchange zone (+30 cm/s). Individualism priming did not impair changeover performance. The boundary conditions of priming effects applied to collective and interdependent tasks are discussed within the implicit coordination framework.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.