Atrocities in theory and practice: An introduction

Classical counterinsurgency theory – written before the 19th century – has generally strongly opposed atrocities, as have theoreticians writing on how to conduct insurgencies. For a variety of reasons – ranging from pragmatic to religious or humanitarian – theoreticians of both groups have particularly argued for the lenient treatment of civilians associated with the enemy camp, although there is a marked pattern of exceptions, for example, where heretics or populations of cities refusing to surrender to besieging armies are concerned. And yet atrocities – defined here as acts of violence against the unarmed (non-combatants, or wounded or imprisoned enemy soldiers), or needlessly painful and/or humiliating treatment of enemy combatants, beyond any action needed to incapacitate or disarm them – occur frequently in small wars. Examples abound where these exhortations have been ignored, both by forces engaged in an insurgency and by forces trying to put down a rebellion. Why have so many atrocities been committed in war if so many arguments have been put forward against them? This is the basic puzzle for which the individual contributions to this special issue are seeking to find tentative answers, drawing on case studies.

International terrorism, domestic political instability, and the escalation effect

What are the main causes of international terrorism? Despite the meticulous examination of various candidate explanations, existing estimates still diverge in sign, size, and significance. This article puts forward a novel explanation and supporting evidence. We argue that domestic political instability provides the learning environment needed to successfully execute international terror attacks. Using a yearly panel of 123 countries over 1973–2003, we find that the occurrence of civil wars increases fatalities and the number of international terrorist acts by 45%. These results hold for alternative indicators of political instability, estimators, subsamples, subperiods, and accounting for competing explanations.

Paix et guerre selon Christine de Pizan

Analysis of the thinking on just war and conflict mediation of the only classical woman strategist, who lived around 1400, and wrote this with a view to the Hundred Years' War and civil wars and insurgencies taking place in her lifetime. Christine de Pizan's Feats of Arms and Chivalry would later become the first printed and widely distributed field manual, translated into English and printed by Caxton for Henry VII Tudor.

Varieties of parliamentarianism

From the start of the English civil war, the parliamentarians were a fragmented coalition, held together by distrust of the king and a belief that Parliament was entitled to lead action to remedy his government’s deficiencies. The driving motivations of parliamentarians were various, including the religious commitments of puritanism, legalistic thought about the ancient constitution, and more radical notions of republicanism or natural rights. Historians have disputed whether parliamentarianism had an inherent strand of radicalism – or radical potential – from the early 1640s, but radicalization certainly took place as the civil wars went on, alongside more ‘conservative’ reactions against the propaganda and wartime measures employed by parliament. Parliamentarian radicalism itself was varied in character, embracing the Levellers’ populism, parliamentary absolutism, and millenarian and providentialist ideas.

Post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding

Civil wars are the most common type of large scale violent conflict. They are long, brutal and continue to harm societies long after the shooting stops. Post-conflict countries face extraordinary challenges with respect to development and security. In this paper we examine how countries can recover economically from these devastating conflicts and how international interventions can help to build lasting peace. We revisit the aid and growth debate and confirm that aid does not increase growth in general. However, we find that countries experience increased growth after the end of the war and that aid helps to make the most of this peace dividend. However, aid is only growth enhancing when the violence has stopped, in violent post-war societies aid has no growth enhancing effect. We also find that good governance is robustly correlated with growth, however we cannot confirm that aid increases growth conditional on good policies. We examine various aspects of aid and governance by disaggregating the aid and governance variables. Our analysis does not provide a clear picture of which types of aid and policy should be prioritized. We find little evidence for a growth enhancing effect of UN missions and suggest that case studies may provide better insight into the relationship between security guarantees and economic stabilization.