The role of competition and state aid policy in financial and monetary law

During the financial crisis, companies and lenders found themselves in distressed situations. Competition authorities across the globe had to deal with controversial issues such as the application of the failing firm defence in merger transactions as well as assessment of emergency aid granted by states. This article considers competition policy in periods of crisis, in particular the failing firm defence in merger control and its state aid policy.

A rate and state friction law for saline ice

Sea ice friction models are necessary to predict the nature of interactions between sea ice floes. These interactions are of interest on a range of scales, for example, to predict loads on engineering structures in icy waters or to understand the basin-scale motion of sea ice. Many models use Amonton's friction law due to its simplicity. More advanced models allow for hydrodynamic lubrication and refreezing of asperities; however, modeling these processes leads to greatly increased complexity. In this paper we propose, by analogy with rock physics, that a rate- and state-dependent friction law allows us to incorporate memory (and thus the effects of lubrication and bonding) into ice friction models without a great increase in complexity. We support this proposal with experimental data on both the laboratory (∼0.1 m) and ice tank (∼1 m) scale. These experiments show that the effects of static contact under normal load can be incorporated into a friction model. We find the parameters for a first-order rate and state model to be A = 0.310, B = 0.382, and μ0 = 0.872. Such a model then allows us to make predictions about the nature of memory effects in moving ice-ice contacts.

State practice, customary humanitarian law and civilian casualties of armed conflict

The article examines the customary international law credentials of the humanitarian law rules proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICR) in 2005. It relies on the BIICL/Chatham House analysis as a ‘constructive comment’ on the methodology of the ICRC study and the rules formed as a result of that methodology with respect to the dead and missing as an aid to determination of their customary law status. It shows that most of the rules studied have a customary international lawpedigree which conforms to the conclusions formed on the rules generally in the Wilmshurst and Breau study. However, the rules with respect to return of personal effects, recording location of graves and notification of relatives of access to gravesites do not seem to have even on a majoritarian/deductive approach enough volume of state practice to establish them as customary with respect to civilians.

Self-defence: A state of mind for states?

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

Neocolonialism and international law, with specific reference to customary counterterrorism obligations and the principle of self-defence

Has international law ever, and, if it has not, can it ever, truly freed itself from the strictures of neocolonialism and the drive by a privileged elite to dominate the world scene? This article begins by inquiring into the nature of neocolonialism and, in so doing, pays particular attention to the writings of former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. It then proceeds to determine how neocolonialist designs surface in international law today by briefly looking at two aspects of international law in particular, namely customary international law, with specific reference to the counterterrorism context, and the principle of self-defence. In the final analysis, this article argues for a necessary and eternal scepticism of international law and the agendas of its privileged gatekeepers. Like classic State power, it opens itself to, and often operates as, neocolonial overreach, and to quote Nkrumah, “[t]he cajolement, the wheedlings, the seductions and the Trojan horses of neo-colonialism must be stoutly resisted, for neo-colonialism is a latter-day harpy, a monster which entices its victims with sweet music.”

Limpets break Dollo's law

A new molecular phylogeny of the limpet molluscs (Calyptraeidae) reveals that coiled shells have independently re-evolved at least once in this family, which is a violation of Dollo's Law that complex ancestral states, once lost, are never reacquired. Reacquisition of the coiled ancestral state is remarkable in that uncoiled shells have been the most recent ancestral state for 20 million-100 million years. Adult coiling might have reevolved by the mechanism of prolonging the period during which genes for coiling are expressed in larvae. This and other developmental mechanisms could provide general routes for maintaining the potential to produce traits lost in distant ancestors.

A qualified defense of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan under international humanitarian law

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international law has had to grapple with the fundamental challenges that large-scale violence carried out by non-State actors poses to the traditional inter- State orientation of international law. Questions related to the “adequacy” and “effectiveness” of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law related to the use of force have been particularly pronounced. This paper focuses on the international humanitarian law implications of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan. A highly-advanced modality of modern warfare, armed drones highlight the possibilities, problems, prospects and pitfalls of high-tech warfare. How is the battlefield to be defined and delineated geographically and temporally? Who can be targeted, and by whom? Ultimately, this paper concludes that American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan are not unlawful as such under international humanitarian law, though, like any tactical decision in the context of asymmetric warfare, they should be continuously and closely monitored according to the dictates of law with sensitivity to facts on the ground.

Redefining the outer boundaries of EU Law: the Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci trilogy

In its three recent rulings in the cases of Zambrano, McCarthy, and Dereci, the Court appears to have been determined to redefine the external boundaries of EU law, in cases involving the family reunification rights of Union citizens.These three judgments can be read as an indication that for Article 20 TFEU to apply, there is no longer a requirement of a cross-border element on the facts of the case, and that it is sufficient if the contested national measure has the effect of ‘depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of their rights (the ‘Zambrano principle’).The cases can, at the same time, also be read as a confirmation that the free movement provisions do – still – require a cross-border element and, in particular, the exercise of inter-State movement, in order to apply. Though the result in these cases has not been entirely unexpected, especially in the aftermath of the Rottmann ruling, it is rather problematic in that, although it is obvious that the Court wishes to redraw the line dividing the national and EU spheres of competence, it does not make it entirely clear where this line now lies and leaves many essential questions unanswered, which will obviously require some time to be resolved. EU lawyers are consequently, once more, left with having to decipher as best as they can the real intentions of the Court in this new line of case-law, which has been further complicated by the fact that what the Court seems to have given with one hand in Zambrano (and before that in Rottmann), has taken it back to a large extent through its rulings in McCarthy and Dereci, which appear to confine the former two cases to their own exceptional facts.6 Moreover, the ‘reverse discrimination Pandora’s box’, the opening of which appears to have been the real target of these references, remains untouched: instead of providing a direct solution to this problem, the Court has chosen to – once again – broaden the scope of the Treaty provisions in order to include within it as many situations as possible and, thus, prevent the emergence of this type of differential treatment on a case-by-case basis.As will be explained, nonetheless, this is by no means an appropriate solution to the reverse discrimination conundrum.