Making the least active pay: a simulation of rewards and penalties under Demand Side Participation programs

The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.

Bayes estimates of distance-to-market: Transactions costs, cooperatives and milk-market development in the Ethiopian highlands

Rationalizing non-participation as a resource deficiency in the household, this paper identifies strategies for milk-market development in the Ethiopian highlands. The additional amounts of covariates required for Positive marketable surplus -'distances-to market'-are computed from a model in which production and sales are correlated; sales are left-censored at some Unobserved thresholds production efficiencies are heterogeneous: and the data are in the form of a panel. Incorporating these features into the modeling exercise ant because they are fundamental to the data-generating environment. There are four reasons. First, because production and sales decisions are enacted within the same household, both decisions are affected by the same exogenous shocks, and production and sales are therefore likely to be correlated. Second. because selling, involves time and time is arguably the most important resource available to a subsistence household, the minimum Sales amount is not zero but, rather, some unobserved threshold that lies beyond zero. Third. the Potential existence of heterogeneous abilities in management, ones that lie latent from the econometrician's perspective, suggest that production efficiencies should be permitted to vary across households. Fourth, we observe a single set of households during multiple visits in a single production year. The results convey clearly that institutional and production) innovations alone are insufficient to encourage participation. Market-precipitating innovation requires complementary inputs, especially improvements in human capital and reductions in risk. Copyright (c) 20 08 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.