Accounting for the economic risk, caused by variation in disease severity, in fungicide dose decisions: exemplified for Mycosphaerella graminicola on winter wheat

A method is presented to calculate economic optimum fungicide doses accounting for the risk-aversion of growers responding to variability in disease severity between crops. Simple dose-response and disease-yield loss functions are used to estimate net disease-related costs (fungicide cost, plus disease-induced yield loss) as a function of dose and untreated severity. With fairly general assumptions about the shapes of the probability distribution of disease severity and the other functions involved, we show that a choice of fungicide dose which minimises net costs on average across seasons results in occasional large net costs caused by inadequate control in high disease seasons. This may be unacceptable to a grower with limited capital. A risk-averse grower can choose to reduce the size and frequency of such losses by applying a higher dose as insurance. For example, a grower may decide to accept ‘high loss’ years one year in ten or one year in twenty (i.e. specifying a proportion of years in which disease severity and net costs will be above a specified level). Our analysis shows that taking into account disease severity variation and risk-aversion will usually increase the dose applied by an economically rational grower. The analysis is illustrated with data on septoria tritici leaf blotch of wheat caused by Mycosphaerella graminicola. Observations from untreated field plots at sites across England over three years were used to estimate the probability distribution of disease severities at mid-grain filling. In the absence of a fully reliable disease forecasting scheme, reducing the frequency of ‘high loss’ years requires substantially higher doses to be applied to all crops. Disease resistant cultivars reduce both the optimal dose at all levels of risk and the disease-related costs at all doses.

Understanding complexities in international accounting standard setting: agenda entry and the case of IFRS for SMEs

Earlier accounting works have shown that an understanding of agenda entry is critical to better understanding the accounting standards setting process. Consider Walker and Robinson (1993; 1994) and Ryan (1998); and more generally agenda entrance as theorized in Kingdon (2011). In 2003, the IASB placed on its agenda a project to promulgate a standard for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs). This provides our focus. It seemed to be a departure from the IASB’s constitutional focus on capital market participants. Kingdon’s three-streams model of agenda entry helps to identify some of the complexities related to politics and decision making messiness that resulted in a standard setting project for simplified IFRS, misleadingly titled IFRS for SMEs. Complexities relate to the broader international regulatory context, including the boundaries of the IASB’s standard-setting jurisdiction, the role of board members in changing those boundaries, and such sensitivities over the language that the IASB could not agree on a suitably descriptive title. The paper shows similarities with earlier agenda entrance studies by Walker and Robinson (1994) and Ryan (1998). By drawing on interviewees’ recollections and other material it especially reinforces the part played by the nuanced complexities that influence what emerges as an international accounting standard.