A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

Land administration in a micro-state: the role of land use planning

Land policy in micro-states and the land administration that underpins it is often devised within a legacy framework inherited from a colonial past. Independence has allowed self-determination of the future political direction yet the range, legal framework, institutional structure and administration systems tend to mirror those of ex-colonial powers. Do land policies, administration systems and processes developed to serve large heavily populated countries scale down to serve the requirements of micro-states? The evidence suggests not: many land administration systems in the Caribbean face difficulties due to poor records, unclear title, exploitation of state lands, incomplete or ongoing land reform programmes, irregular or illegal settlement and non-enforced planning regulations. Land matters are typically the responsibility of several government departments and agencies responsible for land titling and registration, cadastral surveying of property interests, physical planning, taxation and financial regulation. Although planning is regarded as a land administration function, organisational responsibility usually rests with local rather than central government in large countries, but in microstates local government may be politically weak, under-resourced or even non-existent. Using a case study approach this paper explores how planning functions are organised in the Caribbean state of St Vincent & the Grenadines in relation to land administration as a whole and compares the arrangement with other independent micro-states in the region.