Deficits in agency in schizophrenia, and additional deficits in body image, body schema, and internal timing, in passivity symptoms

Individuals with schizophrenia, particularly those with passivity symptoms, may not feel in control of their actions, believing them to be controlled by external agents. Cognitive operations that contribute to these symptoms may include abnormal processing in agency as well as body representations that deal with body schema and body image. However, these operations in schizophrenia are not fully understood, and the questions of general versus specific deficits in individuals with different symptom profiles remain unanswered. Using the projected-hand illusion (a digital video version of the rubber-hand illusion) with synchronous and asynchronous stroking (500 ms delay), and a hand laterality judgment task, we assessed sense of agency, body image, and body schema in 53 people with clinically stable schizophrenia (with a current, past, and no history of passivity symptoms) and 48 healthy controls. The results revealed a stable trait in schizophrenia with no difference between clinical subgroups (sense of agency) and some quantitative (specific) differences depending on the passivity symptom profile (body image and body schema). Specifically, a reduced sense of self-agency was a common feature of all clinical subgroups. However, subgroup comparisons showed that individuals with passivity symptoms (both current and past) had significantly greater deficits on tasks assessing body image and body schema, relative to the other groups. In addition, patients with current passivity symptoms failed to demonstrate the normal reduction in body illusion typically seen with a 500 ms delay in visual feedback (asynchronous condition), suggesting internal timing problems. Altogether, the results underscore self-abnormalities in schizophrenia, provide evidence for both trait abnormalities and state changes specific to passivity symptoms, and point to a role for internal timing deficits as a mechanistic explanation for external cues becoming a possible source of self-body input.

The brain’s fingers and hands

The brain keeps track of the changing positions of body parts in space using a spatial body schema. When subjects localise a tactile stimulus on the skin, they might either use a somatotopic body map, or use a body schema to identify the location of the stimulation in external space. Healthy subjects were touched on the fingertips, with the hands in one of two postures: either the right hand was vertically above the left, or the fingers of both hands were interwoven. Subjects made speeded verbal responses to identify either the finger or the hand that was touched. Interweaving the fingers significantly impaired hand identification across several experiments, but had no effect on finger identification. Our results suggest that identification of fingers occurs in a somatotopic representation or finger schema. Identification of hands uses a general body schema, and is influenced by external spatial location. This dissociation implies that touches on the finger can only be identified with a particular hand after a process of assigning fingers to hands. This assignment is based on external spatial location. Our results suggest a role of the body schema in the identification of structural body parts from touch.

Cognitive and bodily selves: how do they interact following brain lesion?

Dualism has long distinguished between the mental and the body experiences. Probing the structure and organisation of the self traditionally calls for a distinction between these two sides of the self coin. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to address these philosophical issues, and our starting point will be the simple distinction between reflective processes involved in the elaboration of body image, self awareness and self-recognition (i.e. ‘the self’) and the sensori-motor dialogues involved in action control, reactions and automatisms (i.e. ‘the body’ schema). This oversimplification does not take into account the complex interactions taking place between these two levels of description, but our initial aim will be to distinguish between them, before addressing the question of their interactions. Cognitive and sensori-motor processes have frequently been distinguished (review: Rossetti and Revonsuo 2000), and it may be proposed that a similar dissociation can be put forward, a priori, between a central representation of self and a bodily representation corresponding to body schema (Figure 1).