The regulation of cyber warfare under the jus ad bellum

This chapter evaluates the potential for legal regulation of the resort to cyber warfare between states under the ‘jus ad bellum’ (the law on the use of force). Debate in the literature has largely concerned whether cyber warfare falls within the scope of Article 2(4) UNC. The first part of this chapter sets out this debate. It then goes on to argue that the ‘Article 2(4) debate’ often misses the fact that an act of cyber warfare can be considered a breach of a different legal rule: the principle of non-intervention. The chapter further considers some of the issues in applying either the prohibition of the use of force or the principle of non-intervention to cyber warfare, and then concludes by arguing that the debate should be reoriented to focus on another existing international legal obligation: the duty to prevent cyber-attacks.

Remote law-making? American drone strikes and the development of jus ad bellum

There is growing concern amongst international lawyers that the United States’ use of unmanned armed vehicles to conduct lethal targeting operations against non-state actors is setting a dangerous precedent for the future and might lead to an erosion of important rules under international law. Taking seriously these concerns, this article examines in more detail the potential precedent created by the US through its lethal drone strikes and the provided justifications, for the purpose of the development of jus ad bellum. In identifying the claims made by the US under different theories of customary international law as qualified practice or expressions of opinio juris that can lead to an alteration of the law should they be accepted by the international community, this article takes a first step towards a more extensive debate on the potential effects of the US drone strikes on the development of international law.

Medusa, Antaeus, and Caesar Libycus

Although it is well known that Lucan’s Libya is a wild and threatening place, its threat is not restricted to indigenous people, places and things, such as Hannibal, Cleopatra, the Syrtes, or the desert with its catalogue of horrifying snakes. He also associates Libya with anti-Republican Romans, above all Julius Caesar, who endangers the Republic with his excessive, animalistic energy and resembles the continent where he is trapped in the final book. Although the gods as characters are removed from the world of the Bellum Civile, Lucan allows supernatural traces to linger in particular locations such as the Gallic grove in Book 3 or Thessaly in Book 6. Libya is by far the greatest of these reservoirs of frightening myth and fantasy, which do violence to the historical credibility of the narrative, just as Libya itself is presented as the origin or conduit of a number of historical characters who assault Italy and Europe. Lucan’s two mythic narratives (Antaeus in Book 4 and Medusa in Book 9) are essential parts of the hostile Libyan landscape, but in very different ways. The male Antaeus, associated with lions, is connected with a region of solid rock where he was destroyed. The female Medusa, associated with snakes, is connected with a region of shifting sands where she left a deadly, everlasting legacy. To complicate matters further, even though Medusa’s snakes represent the annihilation of the Republican self, the logic of the narrative is undermined and there is even a sympathetic subtext. As part of Libya’s historical and mythical legacy, these stories reveal that for Lucan, historical epic is linked with Republicanism, but mythical epic is in the service of dictatorship.

Military targeting in the context of self-defence actions

In order to bring conceptual clarity to a particular dimension of the relationship between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule in both branches of international law. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between these regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war, by covering possible gaps in the jus in bello targeting rules.