Name agreement in picture naming: An ERP study

Name agreement is the extent to which different people agree on a name for a particular picture. Previous studies have found that it takes longer to name low name agreement pictures than high name agreement pictures. To examine the effect of name agreement in the online process of picture naming, we compared event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded whilst 19 healthy, native English speakers silently named pictures which had either high or low name agreement. A series of ERP components was examined: P1 approximately 120ms from picture onset, N1 around 170ms, P2 around 220ms, N2 around 290ms, and P3 around 400ms. Additionally, a late time window from 800 to 900ms was considered. Name agreement had an early effect, starting at P1 and possibly resulting from uncertainty of picture identity, and continuing into N2, possibly resulting from alternative names for pictures. These results support the idea that name agreement affects two consecutive processes: first, object recognition, and second, lexical selection and/or phonological encoding.

Williams Syndrome: the extent of agreement between parent and self report of psychological difficulties

Background and Objectives: People with Williams syndrome (WS) have been reported by their carers to have problems with attention, anxiety and social relationships. People with WS have been shown to report their anxieties. This study extends our knowledge of how people with WS see themselves in terms of behaviour and social relationships. Methods: A survey using self and parent report forms of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. Results: Both parents and individuals with WS (N = 31) reported difficulties in emotional disorder and hyperactivity symptoms and strengths in prosocial behaviours such as altruism and empathy. They disagreed about peer problems. Conclusions: People with WS understand some but not all of their difficulties. In particular they fail to recognize their social difficulties which may lead them to be vulnerable to exploitation.

Stress testing credit risk: the Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.

Commentary on an example of a tenancy agreement for an agricultural holding

This paper sets out an example of a standard agricultural tenancy, being one creating a tenancy from year to year and consequently covered by the agricultural holdings legislation. A facing-page commentary gives a clause-by-clause analysis of the agreement, the implications of each provision being discussed in the light of the law of contract, agricultural holdings legislation and, where appropriate, subsequent caselaw.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.