Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Paying for long-term performance: restructuring bankers’ pay for risk regulation

The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010. Our paper contributes to both literature and practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently reduce the probability of future bank failures.

Informal finance and rural finance policy in India: historical and contemporary perspectives

From the 1950s up to the early 1990s the All-India data show an ever-declining share of informal credit in the total outstanding debt of rural households. Contemporaneous micro-level studies, using more qualitative research methodologies, provide evidence that questions the strength of this trend, and more recent All-India credit surveys show, first, a levelling, and then a rise, in the share of rural informal credit in 1990/91 and 2000/01, respectively. By reference to findings of a study of village moneylenders in Rajasthan, the paper notes lessons to be drawn. First, informal financial agents have not disappeared from the rural financial landscape in India. Second, formal-sector financial institutions can learn much about rural financial service needs from the financial products and processes of their informal counterparts. Third, a national survey of informal agents, similar to that of the 1921 Census survey of indigenous bankers and moneylenders, would provide valuable pointers towards policy options for the sector. A recent Reserve Bank of India Report on Moneylender Legislation not only explores incentive mechanisms to better ensure fair practice, but also proposes provision for a new category of loan providers that would explicitly link the rural informal and formal financial sectors.

The use and impacts of bank support on UK small and medium-sized enterprises

This article examines an under-investigated area in relationship banking, i.e. the use of bank advice and support and its impacts on the financial conditions of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The findings indicate that the characteristics of businesses and entrepreneurs, among other factors, have determinant effects on the use of bank support by SMEs when they make financial decisions. SMEs can alleviate the severity of their financial problems significantly by using bank support more fully, through developing long-term relationships with banks as primary network partners. The article further recognises the value of advice from banks as a substitute for entrepreneurial human capital, especially when bankers use private information to determine the nature and level of financial and non-financial assistance that they are prepared to supply to their clients.

Collective financing among Chinese entrepreneurs and department store retailing in China

Chinese entrepreneurship in department store retailing differed from that seen in other emerging economies before 1940. Rather than the leading examples of the format being owned by advanced economy firms, in China a small group of Cantonese entrepreneurs established what became known as the ‘Big Four’ department stores in Shanghai. By 1940 the ‘Big Four’ department stores were among the most famous stores in China, and among the biggest businesses in China. None of these Chinese entrepreneurs had any prior experience in department store retailing. Rather this article explains how their success in department store retailing was dependent on a business model that enabled these Chinese entrepreneurs to act as informal investment bankers (or ‘shadow’ banks) for the thousands of overseas Chinese wanting to invest surplus savings in mainland China, so creating large indigenous business groups.