Introduction: the legacy of Greek political thought

This Introduction offers context for the individual papers by examining the intersections and productive tensions between political thought and classical reception studies. While Plato and Aristotle have long been privileged interlocutors for political philosophers, classical reception studies has pluralised both this ancient canon and given rise to a more complex understanding of the modern heirs of ancient political thought. Similarly, the insights of studying the history of political texts and ideas across a longer tradition calls into question the fixity of concepts such as democracy, empire and political freedom. Indeed, we query the very notion of tradition by emphasising how the past has been repeatedly constructed and reconstructed in divergent modern political discourses and conversely how modern political theories and realities have been shaped and reshaped by an idea of antiquity. The Introduction closes with a brief survey of the collected papers.

Climate change justice: getting motivated in the last chance saloon

A key reason for pessimism with respect to greenhouse gas emissions reduction relates to the ‘motivation problem’, whereby those who could make the biggest difference prima facie have the least incentive to act because they are most able to adapt: how can we motivate such people (and thereby everyone else) to accept, indeed to initiate, the changes to their lifestyles that are required for effective emissions reductions? This paper offers an account inspired by Rawls of the good of membership of ‘intergenerational cooperative union’ to achieve justice that provides a solution to the motivation problem.

Internal doubts about Cohen's Rescue of Justice

G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible.

Extending the golden thread? Criminalisation and the presumption of innocence

It seems to be widely accepted that the presumption of innocence, and the attendant standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' properly apply in the courtroom as a procedural principle directly grounded in the moral imperative to avoid punishing those who should not be punished. In this article I argue that if this is correct, then we ought be as careful about what we criminalise, as we are about who we punish, since people can be wrongfully punished by criminalisation errors as well as by conviction errors.

When consent doesn't work: a rights-based case for limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise

Consent's capacity to legitimise actions and claims is limited by conditions such as coercion, which render consent ineffective. A better understanding of the limits to consent's capacity to legitimise can shed light on a variety of applied debates, in political philosophy, bioethics, economics and law. I show that traditional paternalist explanations for limits to consent's capacity to legitimise cannot explain the central intuition that consent is often rendered ineffective when brought about by a rights violation or threatened rights violation. I argue that this intuition is an expression of the same principles of corrective justice that underlie norms of compensation and rectification. I show how these principles can explain and clarify core intuitions about conditions which render consent ineffective, including those concerned with the consenting agent's option set, his mental competence, and available information.

ELMs disease? Corporatism, stewardship and citizenship in the English countryside

Varying concepts of citizenship, implicit within policy providing countryside access opportunities in England and the sometimes contrasting political rhetoric concerning citizenship, are evaluated here. The focus for this paper surrounds the Countryside Stewardship Scheme and, generically, the access elements of Environmental Land Management schemes (ELMs) and the implications of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act in this context. Policy formulation in respect of countryside access may not be prepared considering the philosophical implications for citizens rights or property rights constructions. However, it is hypothesized that particular modes of regulation and commodification (of certain countryside goods) are imbued with certain values which reflect a neo-Liberal political philosophy. This view is contextualized within present theoretical debates concerning rural society.

Playing Kant at the Court of King Arthur

This article contrasts the sense in which those whom Bernard Williams called ‘political realists’ and John Rawls are committed to the idea that political philosophy has to be distinctively political. Distinguishing the realist critique of political moralism from debates over ideal and non-ideal theory, it is argued that Rawls is more realist than many realists realise, and that realists can learn more about how to make a distinctively political vision of how our life together should be organised from his theorising, although it also points to a worrying tendency among Rawlsians to reach for inappropriately moralised arguments. G. A. Cohen’s advocacy of socialism and the second season of HBO’s The Wire are used as examples to illustrate these points.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.