The theme that dare not speak its name: Geopolitik, geopolitics and German foreign policy since unification

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the emergence of a new security imaginary in the foreign policy discourse in Germany during the 1990s and to determine whether it constitutes a return of Geopolitik in German foreign policy making. Does the re- appearance of geopolitical terms and expressions in the official and the academic discourses in post-unification Germany indicate such a shift? The essay will argue that the claims about a return of Geopolitik cannot be sustained. To the extent that the rhetoric of German government officials changes during the 1990s, this does not produce a coherent geopolitical security imaginary that stands diametrically opposed to the definition of political and institutional spaces of the Bonner Republik.

National interest to global reform: patterns of reasoning in British foreign policy discourse

Discussion of the national interest often focuses on how Britain's influence can be maximized, rather than on the goals that influence serves. Yet what gives content to claims about the national interest is the means-ends reasoning which links interests to deeper goals. In ideal-typical terms, this can take two forms. The first, and more common, approach is conservative: it infers national interests and the goals they advance from existing policies and commitments. The second is reformist: it starts by specifying national goals and then asks how they are best advanced under particular conditions. New Labour's foreign policy discourse is notable for its explicit use of a reformist approach. Indeed, Gordon Brown's vision of a 'new global society' not only identifies global reform as a key means of fulfilling national goals, but also thereby extends the concept of the national interest well beyond a narrow concern with national security.

Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special relationship

At the heart of the ‘special relationship’ ideology, there is supposed to be a grand bargain. In exchange for paying the ‘blood price’ as America's ally, Britain will be rewarded with exceptional influence over American foreign policy and its strategic behaviour. Soldiers and statesman continue to articulate this idea. Since 9/11, the notion of Britain playing ‘Greece’ to America's ‘Rome’ gained new life thanks to Anglophiles on both sides of the Atlantic. One potent version of this ideology was that the more seasoned British would teach Americans how to fight ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby bolstering their role as tutor to the superpower. Britain does derive benefits from the Anglo-American alliance and has made momentous contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet British solidarity and sacrifices have not purchased special influence in Washington. This is partly due to Atlanticist ideology, which sets Britain unrealistic standards by which it is judged, and partly because the notion of ‘special influence’ is misleading as it loses sight of the complexities of American policy-making. The overall result of expeditionary wars has been to strain British credibility in American eyes and to display its lack of consistent influence both over high policy and the design and execution of US military campaigns. While there may be good arguments in favour of the UK continuing its efforts in Afghanistan, the notion that the war fortifies Britain's vicarious world status is a dangerous illusion that leads to repeated overstretch and disappointment. Now that Britain is in the foothills of a strategic defence review, it is important that the British abandon this false consciousness.

Mutamenti politico-istituzionali nella Venezia Giulia e a Trieste tra Tito e gli americani alla luce delle nuove testimonianze documentarie da Washington, 1944-1954

“La questione di Trieste”, ovvero la questione del confine italo-yugoslavo all’indomani della seconda guerra mondiale costituisce da lungo tempo oggetto di attenzione e di esame da parte della storiografia italiana e straniera. Con alcune importanti eccezioni, la ricostruzione complessiva di quelle vicende ha visto il più delle volte il prevalere di un approccio storico-diplomatico che ha reso difficile comprendere con chiarezza i rapporti e le interdipendenze fra contesto locale, contesto nazionale e contesto internazionale. Attraverso la lettura incrociata dell’ampia documentazione proveniente dai fondi dei National Archives Records Administration (NARA) questo studio tenta una rilettura delle varie fasi di sviluppo della questione nel periodo compreso tra il giugno del 1945 e l’ottobre del 1954 secondo una duplice prospettiva: nella prima parte si concentra sulla politica americana a Trieste, guardando nello specifico a due aspetti interni tra loro strettamente correlati, la gestione dell’ordine pubblico e la “strategia” del consenso da realizzarsi mediante il controllo dell’informazione da un lato e la promozione di una politica culturale dall’altro. Sono aspetti entrambi riconducibili al modello del direct rule, che conferiva al governo militare alleato (GMA) piena ed esclusiva autorità di governo sulla zona A della Venezia Giulia, e che ci appaiono centrali anche per cogliere l’interazione fra istituzioni e soggetti sociali. Nella seconda parte, invece, il modificarsi della fonte d’archivio indica un cambiamento di priorità nella politica estera americana relativa a Trieste: a margine dei negoziati internazionali, i documenti del fondo Clare Boothe Luce nelle carte dell’Ambasciata mostrano soprattutto come la questione di Trieste venne proiettata verso l’esterno, verso l’Italia in particolare, e sfruttata – principalmente dall’ambasciatrice – nell’ottica bipolare della guerra fredda per rinforzare il sostegno interno alla politica atlantica. Il saggio, dunque, si sviluppa lungo due linee: dentro e fuori Trieste, dentro 1945-1952, fuori 1953-1954, perché dalle fonti consultate sono queste ad emergere come aree di priorità nei due periodi. Abstract - English The “Trieste question”, or the question regarding the Italian - Yugoslav border after the Second World War, has been the object of careful examination in both Italian and foreign historiography for a long time. With a few important exceptions, the overall reconstruction of these events has been based for the most part on historic and diplomatic approaches, which have sometimes made it rather difficult to understand clearly the relationships and interdependences at play between local, national and international contexts. Through a comparative analysis of a large body of documents from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park MD, this essay attempts a second reading of the various phases in which the question developed between June 1945 and October 1954, following a twofold perspective: the first part focuses on American policy for Trieste, specifically looking at two internal and closely linked aspects, on the one hand, the management of ‘law and order’, as well as a ‘strategy’ of consent, to be achieved through the control of all the means of information , and, on the other, the promotion of a cultural policy. Both aspects can be traced back to the ‘direct rule’ model, which gave the Allied Military Government (AMG) full and exclusive governing authority over Venezia Giulia’s Zone A. These issues are also fundamental to a better understanding of the relationships between institutions and social subjects. In the second part of the essay , the change in archival sources clearly indicates a new set of priorities in American foreign policy regarding Trieste: outside any international negotiations for the settlement of the question, the Clare Boothe Luce papers held in the Embassy’s archives, show how the Trieste question was focused on external concerns, Italy in particular, and exploited – above all by the ambassador – within the bi-polar optic of the Cold War, in order to strengthen internal support for Atlantic policies. The essay therefore follows two main lines of inquiry: within and outside Trieste, within in 1945-1952, and outside 1953-1954, since, from the archival sources used, these emerge as priority areas in the two periods.

Half-remembered quotations from mostly forgotten speeches: the limits of Labour’s European policy discourse

This article uses discourse analysis to study the continuities in British foreign policy thinking within the Labour party from the 1960s to the present day. Using representative extracts from speeches by Hugh Gaitskell, Harold Wilson, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, it identifies the ideational consis- tencies in the leaders’ attitudes to: Empire; federalism in the EEC/EU; and laying down conditions that have to be met before any constructive engagement with ‘Europe’ can be countenanced. We argue that these consistencies, spanning a 50-year period, exemplify a certain stagnation both within Labour’s European discourses and within British foreign policy thinking more widely. We develop the idea that Labour party thinking has been crucially framed by both small ‘c’ conser- vative and upper-case Conservative ideology, popularised by Winston Churchill in his ‘three circles’ model of British foreign policy.

Britain and the Commonwealth: confronting the past - imagining the future

This is an extended version of Philip Murphy's inaugural lecture as director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, delivered on 23 February 2011. It traces the relationship of the UK with the wider Commonwealth over 40 years, paying particular attention to the rhetoric of governments and opposition parties from Wilson and Heath to Cameron. It examines the reasons for the Commonwealth being relegated to a peripheral role in British foreign policy, especially European preoccupations and the issues of Rhodesia and South Africa. It argues that the Commonwealth remains of considerable practical and enormous symbolic importance to the UK. The British government should engage with the Commonwealth more than it has done in the recent past and the Commonwealth should be both open to and critical of its imperial past.

What should we expect of a liberal explanatory theory?

One of the most problematic aspects of the ‘Harvard School’ of liberal international theory is its failure to fulfil its own methodological ideals. Although Harvard School liberals subscribe to a nomothetic model of explanation, in practice they employ their theories as heuristic resources. Given this practice, we should expect them neither to develop candidate causal generalizations nor to be value-neutral: their explanatory insights are underpinned by value-laden choices about which questions to address and what concepts to employ. A key question for liberal theorists, therefore, is how a theory may be simultaneously explanatory and value-oriented. The difficulties inherent in resolving this problem are manifested in Ikenberry’s writing: whilst his work on constitutionalism in international politics partially fulfils the requirements of a more satisfactory liberal explanatory theory, his recent attempts to develop prescriptions for US foreign policy reproduce, in a new form, key failings of Harvard School realism.

Constructive engagement?

Can 'constructive engagement' provide a bridge between the pursuit of national interest and concern for human rights? This book explores the experience of Chester Crocker, Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and his policy of 'constructive engagement' with Pretoria during apartheid. It is argued that the policy was, in part, a Cold War-driven attempt to maintain strategically important ties with the South African government, and it explores the repercussions of this. The book also explores the linkage of Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. The analysis of this policy has important relevance to the foreign policy dilemmas of today. Abuse of human rights can render some disenfranchised groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and it is argued that Reagan's myopic globalism is being repeated in America's 'War on Terror'. The policy of 'constructive engagement' is once again being used as a diplomatic fig leaf for realpolitik, rather than as a vital tool of diplomacy.