Absorption and metabolism of olive oil secoiridoids in the small intestine

The secoiridoids 3,4-dihydroxyphenylethanol-elenolic acid (3,4-DHPEA-EA) and 3,4-dihydroxyphenylethanol-elenolic acid dialdehyde (3,4-DHPEA-EDA) account for approximately 55 % of the phenolic content of olive oil and may be partly responsible for its reported human health benefits. We have investigated the absorption and metabolism of these secoiridoids in the upper gastrointestinal tract. Both 3,4-DHPEA-EDA and 3,4-DHPEA-EA were relatively stable under gastric conditions, only undergoing limited hydrolysis. Both secoiridoids were transferred across a human cellular model of the small intestine (Caco-2 cells). However, no glucuronide conjugation was observed for either secoiridoid during transfer, although some hydroxytyrosol and homovanillic alcohol were formed. As Caco-2 cells are known to express only limited metabolic activity, we also investigated the absorption and metabolism of secoiridoids in isolated, perfused segments of the jejunum and ileum. Here, both secoiridoids underwent extensive metabolism, most notably a two-electron reduction and glucuronidation during the transfer across both the ileum and jejunum. Unlike Caco-2 cells, the intact small-intestinal segments contain NADPH-dependent aldo-keto reductases, which reduce the aldehyde carbonyl group of 3,4-DHPEA-EA and one of the two aldeydic carbonyl groups present on 3,4-DHPEA-EDA. These reduced forms are then glucuronidated and represent the major in vivo small-intestinal metabolites of the secoiridoids. In agreement with the cell studies, perfusion of the jejunum and ileum also yielded hydroxytyrosol and homovanillic alcohol and their respective glucuronides. We suggest that the reduced and glucuronidated forms represent novel physiological metabolites of the secoiridoids that should be pursued in vivo and investigated for their biological activity.

An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with confirmed Proposals

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

The full infinite dimensional moment problem on semi-algebraic sets of generalized functions

We consider a generic basic semi-algebraic subset S of the space of generalized functions, that is a set given by (not necessarily countably many) polynomial constraints. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an infinite sequence of generalized functions to be realizable on S, namely to be the moment sequence of a finite measure concentrated on S. Our approach combines the classical results about the moment problem on nuclear spaces with the techniques recently developed to treat the moment problem on basic semi-algebraic sets of Rd. In this way, we determine realizability conditions that can be more easily verified than the well-known Haviland type conditions. Our result completely characterizes the support of the realizing measure in terms of its moments. As concrete examples of semi-algebraic sets of generalized functions, we consider the set of all Radon measures and the set of all the measures having bounded Radon–Nikodym density w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.