Al-Qaeda - terrorists, hypocrites, fundamentalists? The view from within

This article investigates the ideology of Al-Qaeda as perceived from within the network. Particular attention is paid to the ideological background of Al-Qaeda's intellectual leadership, its sociopolitical context and the nature of its recruits. The inner logic of the Al-Qaeda organisation advances an intellectual concept that is not based on the main schools of Islamic theology, but on a new ideological starting point that results from the application of Islamic principles to sociopolitical change. With its political goals reinforced by the teachings of the Quran, exemplified by the content and rhetoric of a recently discovered training manual, the organisation creates powerful imagery embedded in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community. Thus, the message provided by Al-Qaeda inspires its followers to commit violent acts of destruction while being fully convinced that they are fulfilling the ordained will of Allah.

The death of Osama bin Laden - the end of Al-Qaeda's Pan-Islamic ambition?

This paper evaluates the implications of Osama bin Ladin’s death for the future of al-Qaeda’s global jihad. It critically examines the debate as to the make-up of the group and identifies bin Ladin’s primary role as chief ideologue advocating a defensive jihad to liberate the umma. The rationale and appeal of bin Ladin’s message and Muslims’ reaction to both his statements and al-Qaeda’s increasing use of sectarian violence are assessed in the context of Pan-Islam as political ideology. The paper concludes that while the ideal of Islamic unity and the sentiment of Muslim solidarity are unlikely to vanish, al-Qaeda’s violent jihad has not only failed to achieve these goals but has worked against it, thereby confining it to the political margins.

Here come the Salafis: the framing of Al-Qaeda's ideology within terrorism research

The purpose of the paper is to analyse different narratives about al Qaeda (AQ) in Terrorism Studies, and to demonstrate the methodological and empirical problems associated with them. It demonstrates that AQ as it emerges within Terrorism Studies is more of an artefact of preconceived notions about fundamentalist ideology than the result of rigid empirical research.

Fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the nature of the Islamist threat and the effectiveness of US counterterrorism strategy

This paper evaluates the US’ perception of and response to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operating in Yemen. It evaluates the empirical evidence on which the present understanding of the group is based, the implications of the socio-political context in which it operates, and the uneasy position of the Yemeni government in the war against terror as it has been affected by US policy from the early 1990s to the present. In the contested Yemeni state, AQAP is competing for political legitimacy and is increasingly dependent on public support. The US’ kill-or-capture response, the “on-off” nature of its support that has made Yemen vulnerable to the influence of al-Qaeda in the past, and the actions of the Yemeni government itself, which depends on the continued existence of the threat to secure financial support vital for political survival, means that none of the measures being taken has the potential to defeat AQAP.

How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation

This article investigates the contested ideology of al-Qaeda through an analysis of Osama bin Ladin’s writings and public statements issued between 1994 and 2011, set in relation to the development of Islamic thought and changing socio-political realities in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Challenging popular conceptions of Wahhabism and the “Salafi jihad”, it reveals an idealistic, Pan-Islamic sentiment at the core of his messages that is not based on the main schools of Islamic theology, but is the result of a crisis of meaning of Islam in the modern world. Both before and after the death of al-Qaeda’s iconic leader, the continuing process of religious, political and intellectual fragmentation of the Muslim world has led to bin Ladin’s vision for unity being replaced by local factions and individuals pursuing their own agendas in the name of al-Qaeda and Islam.