The engineer under FDIC's conditions of contract for construction

FIDIC has over the years produced standard forms of contracts for the international procurement of projects. A source of continuing criticism of its Red Book concerns the duality in the traditional role of the engineer as the employer's agent and as an independent third party holding the balance fairly between the employer and the contractor. In response to this and other criticisms FIDIC produced a replacement for it in 1999. The role of the engineer under the new Red Book is critically examined in the light of relevant case law, expert commentaries and feedback from two multidisciplinary workshops with international participation. The examination identified three major changes: (1) a duty to act impartially has been replaced by a duty to make fair determination of certain matters; (2) it is open to parties to allow greater control of the engineer by the employer by stating in the appropriate part of the contract powers the engineer must not exercise without the employer's approval; (3) there is provision for a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) to which disputes may be referred. Although the duality has not been eliminated completely, the contract is structured flexibly enough to support those who wish to contract on the basis of the engineer acting solely as the agent of the employer.

Best practice in the training, appointment and remuneration of members of dispute boards for large infrastructure projects

This paper reports part of a qualitative study into evolving practice in the implementation of the Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) construction dispute resolution technique, a variant of the Dispute Review Board (DRB) concept used in the US and Canada. Data was collected through a focus group interview of 20 highly experienced dispute resolution practitioners from engineering and the law. The group was assembled from members of FIDIC-NET with direct experience of project DABs. The part reported here concerns practice and procedure for establishing DABs. The main findings are that: constitution of the DABs is often delayed because of either project owners' ignorance of the DAB process or deterrence by the cost of the DABs; such owners also tend to insist on appointing DAB members from local engineers and lawyers without sufficient understanding of the DAB process; rates of remuneration of DAB members vary widely; the training provision for DAB membership and advocacy skills is inadequate; the process of selecting candidates for DAB membership and negotiating the tripartite agreement between each member and the contractual parties needs to be navigated with great care to avoid raising ethical problems. The research contribution is threefold. First, it highlights the importance of realistic fees for DAB members within a standard framework in achieving timely establishment of a board that works well as a team. Second, it illustrates the use of qualitative focus group interview to study the impact of new contract terms from multiple stakeholder perspectives. Finally, it identifies areas where further research is needed.