Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.

Drivers' ratings of different components of their own driving skill: a greater illusion of superiority for skills that relate to accident involvement

Different components of driving skill relate to accident involvement in different ways. For instance, while hazard-perception skill has been found to predict accident involvement, vehicle-control skill has not. We found that drivers rated themselves superior to both their peers and the average driver on 18 components of driving skill (N = 181 respondents). These biases were greater for hazard-perception skills than for either vehicle-control skills or driving skill in general. Also, ratings of hazard-perception skill related to self-perceived safety after overall skill was controlled for. We suggest that although drivers appear to appreciate the role of hazard perception in safe driving, any safety benefit to be derived from this appreciation may be undermined by drivers' inflated opinions of their own hazard-perception skill. We also tested the relationship between illusory beliefs about driving skill and risk taking and looked at ways of manipulating drivers' illusory beliefs.

Motorcycle accident risk could be inflated by a time to arrival illusion

Purpose. Drivers adopt smaller safety margins when pulling out in front of motorcycles compared with cars. This could partly account for why the most common motorcycle/car accident involves a car violating a motorcyclist's right of way. One possible explanation is the size-arrival effect in which smaller objects are perceived to arrive later than larger objects. That is, drivers may estimate the time to arrival of motorcycles to be later than cars because motorcycles are smaller. Methods. We investigated arrival time judgments using a temporal occlusion paradigm. Drivers recruited from the student population (n = 28 and n = 33) saw video footage of oncoming vehicles and had to press a response button when they judged that vehicles would reach them. Results. In experiment 1, the time to arrival of motorcycles was estimated to be significantly later than larger vehicles (a car and a van) for different approach speeds and viewing times. In experiment 2, we investigated an alternative explanation to the size-arrival effect: that the smaller size of motorcycles places them below the threshold needed for observers to make an accurate time to arrival judgment using tau. We found that the motorcycle/car difference in arrival time estimates was maintained for very short occlusion durations when tau could be estimated for both motorcycles and cars. Conclusions. Results are consistent with the size-arrival effect and are inconsistent with the tau threshold explanation. Drivers estimate motorcycles will reach them later than cars across a range of conditions. This could have safety implications.

A behavioral comparison between motorcyclists and a matched group of non-motorcycling car drivers: factors influencing accident risk

Motorcyclists and a matched group of non-motorcycling car drivers were assessed on behavioral measures known to relate to accident involvement. Using a range of laboratory measures, we found that motorcyclists chose faster speeds than the car drivers, overtook more, and pulled into smaller gaps in traffic, though they did not travel any closer to the vehicle in front. The speed and following distance findings were replicated by two further studies involving unobtrusive roadside observation. We suggest that the increased risk-taking behavior of motorcyclists was only likely to account for a small proportion of the difference in accident risk between motorcyclists and car drivers. A second group of motorcyclists was asked to complete the simulator tests as if driving a car. They did not differ from the non-motorcycling car drivers on the risk-taking measures but were better at hazard perception. There were also no differences for sensation seeking, mild social deviance, and attitudes to riding/driving, indicating that the risk-taking tendencies of motorcyclists did not transfer beyond motorcycling, while their hazard perception skill did. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Looking in the wrong place for healthcare improvements: a system dynamics study of an accident and emergency department

Accident and Emergency (A&E) units provide a route for patients requiring urgent admission to acute hospitals. Public concern over long waiting times for admissions motivated this study, whose aim is to explore the factors which contribute to such delays. The paper discusses the formulation and calibration of a system dynamics model of the interaction of demand pattern, A&E resource deployment, other hospital processes and bed numbers; and the outputs of policy analysis runs of the model which vary a number of the key parameters. Two significant findings have policy implications. One is that while some delays to patients are unavoidable, reductions can be achieved by selective augmentation of resources within, and relating to, the A&E unit. The second is that reductions in bed numbers do not increase waiting times for emergency admissions, their effect instead being to increase sharply the number of cancellations of admissions for elective surgery. This suggests that basing A&E policy solely on any single criterion will merely succeed in transferring the effects of a resource deficit to a different patient group.

COCO-2: a model to assess the economic impact of an accident

COCO-2 is a model for assessing the potential economic costs likely to arise off-site following an accident at a nuclear reactor. COCO-2 builds on work presented in the model COCO-1 developed in 1991 by considering economic effects in more detail, and by including more sources of loss. Of particular note are: the consideration of the directly affected local economy, indirect losses that stem from the directly affected businesses, losses due to changes in tourism consumption, integration with the large body of work on recovery after an accident and a more systematic approach to health costs. The work, where possible, is based on official data sources for reasons of traceability, maintenance and ease of future development. This report describes the methodology and discusses the results of an example calculation. Guidance on how the base economic data can be updated in the future is also provided.

Tales of the unexpected: research discoveries that occurred by accident

Data from four experimental research projects are presented which have in common that unexpected results caused a change in direction of the research. A plant growth accelerator caused the appearance of white black bean aphids, a synthetic pyrethroid suspected of enhancing aphid reproduction proved to enhance plant growth, a chance conversation with a colleague initiated a search for fungal DNA in aphids, and the accidental invasion of aphid cultures by a parasitoid reversed the aphid population ranking of two Brussels sprout cultivars. This last result led to a whole series of studies on the plant odour preferences of emerging parasitoids which in turn revealed the unexpected phenomenon that chemical cues to the maternal host plant are left with the eggs at oviposition. It is pointed out that, too often, researchers fail to follow up unexpected results because they resist accepting flaws in their hypotheses; also that current application criteria for research funding make it hard to accommodate unexpected findings.

Big data: a normal accident waiting to happen?

Widespread commercial use of the internet has significantly increased the volume and scope of data being collected by organisations. ‘Big data’ has emerged as a term to encapsulate both the technical and commercial aspects of this growing data collection activity. To date, much of the discussion of big data has centred upon its transformational potential for innovation and efficiency, yet there has been less reflection on its wider implications beyond commercial value creation. This paper builds upon normal accident theory (NAT) to analyse the broader ethical implications of big data. It argues that the strategies behind big data require organisational systems that leave them vulnerable to normal accidents, that is to say some form of accident or disaster that is both unanticipated and inevitable. Whilst NAT has previously focused on the consequences of physical accidents, this paper suggests a new form of system accident that we label data accidents. These have distinct, less tangible and more complex characteristics and raise significant questions over the role of individual privacy in a ‘data society’. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the risks of such data accidents might be managed or mitigated.