'A theatre of ruins'. Edward Bond & Samuel Beckett: theatrical antagonists

The playwright Edward Bond has long made known his antagonism to dramatists allied to Martin Esslin’s Theatre of the Absurd. The work of Samuel Beckett has come in for particular criticism by Bond. Using published writings (and unpublished correspondence between myself and Bond), I hope to trace the development of this antagonism between ‘Bondian’ and ‘Beckettian’ views of theatre. However, this article will also set out to argue that both early work such as The Pope’s Wedding (1962), and more recent work such as Coffee (1995), make use of motifs, characters and ideas from Beckett’s theatre. The article will set out provisional reasons why Bond, despite his misgivings, is not averse to incorporating elements from Beckett’s ‘theatre of ruins’, as he terms it, into his own work.

Being and goodness

The old scholastic principle of the "convertibility" of being and goodness strikes nearly all moderns as either barely comprehensible or plain false. "Convertible" is a term of art meaning "interchangeable" in respect of predication, where the predicates can be exchanged salva veritate albeit not salva sensu: their referents are, as the maxim goes, really the same albeit conceptually different. The principle seems, at first blush, absurd. Did the scholastics literally mean that every being is good? Is that supposed to include a cancer, a malaria parasite, an earthquake that kills millions? If every being is good, then no being is bad—but how can that be? To the contemporary philosophical mind, such bafflement is understandable. It derives from the systematic dismantling of the great scholastic edifice that took place over half a millennium. With the loss of the basic concepts out of which that edifice was built, the space created by those concepts faded out of existence as well. The convertibility principle, like virtually all the other scholastic principles (not all, since some do survive and thrive in analytic philosophy), could not persist in a post-scholastic space wholly alien to it.

Intuitions, disagreement and referential pluralism

Mallon, Machery, Nichols and Stich (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356, 2009) argue that the use of intuitions in the philosophy of reference is problematic as recent studies show intuitions about reference vary both within and between cultures. I use some ideas from the recent literature on disagreement and truth relativism to shed light on the debate concerning the appropriate reaction to these studies. Mallon et al. argue that variation is problematic because if one tries to use intuitions which vary to find the correct theory of reference one will end up endorsing an absurd position: referential pluralism. I argue that there is hope for intuition-based philosophy of reference. One can avoid endorsing referential pluralism (as Mallon et al. understand it). Furthermore, referential pluralism may not be so absurd after all.

Arnold v. Britton: a ratio and two sets of obiter dicta

Arnold v Britton marks the final stage of the longstanding dispute as to the correct interpretation of a number of 99-year leases of chalets on a leisure park at Oxwich, in the Gower peninsula, near Swansea. The aspect of the case which has attracted most discussion has, understandably, been its main ratio: the proper way to construe a provision of a lease which arguably has an absurd result. This will be considered in this case-note. The judgment of the Supreme Court – particularly the judgment of Lord Neuberger PSC – does, however contain some observations on the possible reform of the law on service charges which are of interest to those engaged in this field. It also contains some obiter comments on ‘letting schemes’ which are – in the view of the present author – highly unorthodox. These three rather disparate issues which are raised by this case will be considered in turn. As they have little in common with each other, they will be considered as separate sections.